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CONFISCATION OF TERRORIST FUNDS: 
Can the EU Be a Useful Model for ASEAN?
Hamed Tofangsaz
The counter-terrorist financing regime has been developed and dif-
fused rapidly since the 9/11 attacks.  The two central components of the 
regime are criminalization of acts of financing and confiscation of terror-
ist funds.  These measures, which duplicate US laws on terrorist financing, 
have been designed to impose liability on, and confiscate assets and prop-
erty of, those who finance or associate with terrorism regardless of whether 
there is a link between their act of financing or associating and a terror-
ist act.  In the absence of such connection between the offense of terrorist 
financing and its subsequent crime of terrorism, a question arises: What 
is the legal basis for imposing liability on suspected financers and confis-
cating their assets and property? This ambiguity has never been properly 
addressed by the creators of the regime or by those who promote the regime. 
This paper explores whether and how this ambiguity has been addressed 
at the regional level among the Member States of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) where the agenda of countering terrorism 
has been largely shaped by external actors, mainly the Western states and 
international organizations established and controlled by them.  Consid-
ering the fact that counter-terrorism has entered the agenda in the political 
dialogue between the EU and ASEAN, it is worth examining whether EU 
laws and policies on terrorist financing offer themselves as a model for 
ASEAN to emulate.  The paper concludes that the EU, a value-based com-
munity, has failed to deal with the issue of terrorist financing effectively. 
This has resulted in draconian and unjustified overreach of the forfeiture 
laws and policies which, in many ways, are inconsistent with the rule of law, 
human rights, democratic values and good governance.
NOTE
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Introduction
The EU claims a genuine strategic interest in developing and 
strengthening its relationship with the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).1  They both share the same goals for their citizens: 
fostering peace and stability, creating prosperity, and dealing with global 
and regional issues via a multilateral approach.2  In order to reach these 
goals, they each emphasize adherence to a number of fundamental prin-
ciples, such as respect for the rule of law, good governance, fundamental 
freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights and social jus-
tice, the principles of democracy, and constitutional governance.3
They also have a number of ties.  Economically, ASEAN has become 
one of the largest EU trading partners (EU’s second-largest sales market 
and EU’s third-largest trading partner outside Europe, after the US and 
China).4  The EU is also the second-largest investor in ASEAN as well 
as its third-largest trading partner (after Japan and China).  Politically, 
since the EU became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, both 
parties have deepened and stretched their interregional cooperation in 
understanding and addressing international and regional security issues. 
The EU has made significant contributions to efforts towards “confi-
dence-building” and “preventive diplomacy” in the ASEAN region, such 
as democratic government transitions in Cambodia and East Timor.5
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and subse-
quent terrorist attacks in Europe, regional security developments have 
become particularly important for European foreign policy and securi-
ty.  The EU has realised that despite the geographical distance between 
Europe and other regional conflicts, their political or economic stabili-
ty can be affected by these conflicts.6  Consequently, counter-terrorism 
cooperation has become the EU’s top priority in its political dialogues 
with other states.  Europe is of the opinion that “by strengthening the 
capabilities of third states to combat terrorism before it reaches the EU’s 
borders, the EU’s internal security is in turn protected.”7
1. Council Conclusions on EU-ASEAN Relations, Council of the Eur. Union 
(June 22, 2015, 1:35 PM), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releas-
es/2015/06/22-fac-asean-conclusions [https://perma.cc/X3JJ-HGSX].
2. Treaty on European Union, Dec. 13, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326), art. 3.  See As-
sociation of South East Asian Nations Charter, art. 1–2, August 8, 1967.
3. Id.
4. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Comm’n 
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean 
[https://perma.cc/X8C7-FXUP].
5. Frank Umbach, EU–ASEAN Political and Security Dialogue at the 
Beginning of the 21st Century: Prospects for Interregional Cooperation on 
International Terrorism (2004), http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/doc-
ument/13162/ssoar-panorama-2004-1-umbach-eu-asean_political_and_security_dia-
logue.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/3G4E-DS6L].
6. Id.
7. Felix Heiduk, In It Together Yet Worlds Apart? EU–ASEAN Counter-Terror-
ism Cooperation After the Bali Bombings, 36 J. Eur. Integration 696, 698 (2014).
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After the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali and the Philippines, and 
the threat of piracy and terrorist attacks in the waterway connecting Asia 
to Europe and the Middle East known as the Straits of Malacca, regional 
cooperation against terrorism has been added to the agenda in EU dia-
logues with ASEAN.  The EU and ASEAN signed the Joint Declaration 
on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism at the 14th ASEAN-EU Minis-
terial Meeting, calling for the enhancement of their cooperation to fight 
against terrorism.  In doing so, they acknowledged the leading role of 
the United Nations in the fights against terrorism, and reaffirmed their 
strong commitment to the universal implementation of counter-terror-
ism conventions and resolutions.  In its strategic documents, the EU has 
repeatedly listed “the fight against terrorism” as one of the strategic pri-
orities of the EU towards ASEAN.8  The EU stresses that the two regions 
“find themselves more dependent on one another in addressing global 
challenges” and that it “therefore wishes to broaden its programme of 
cooperation with South-East Asia.”9  From the EU perspective, count-
er-terrorism strategies must include not only short-term measures such 
as security and public order measures, but also long-term measures which 
seek to address “the complex and manifold root causes of terrorism (pov-
erty, low education, failing pluralism, and freedom of opinion etc.).”10 
The EU encourages ASEAN to distinguish between “peaceful politi-
cal opposition” and terrorism, and to respect human rights.11  The EU 
also stresses that any cooperation or political dialogue with the ASEAN 
should contain an essential element clause, promoting human rights, rule 
of law, democratic principles and good governance.12
Despite the strong determination to broaden and deepen EU-ASE-
AN cooperation in the fight against terrorism, “[n]o legally binding 
cooperation agreements” in the relevant area have been made between 
the EU and ASEAN.13  Instead, the EU has engaged in a series of 
workshops and conferences, addressing a broad range of terrorism and 
terrorist-related issues.  The EU has, on occasion, provided some limited 
assistance to individual ASEAN Member States in their counter-terror-
ism programmes, such as providing financial assistance to the Philippines 
for efforts on money laundering and border management.14
8. See id; see also European Commission, A New Partnership with Southeast 
Asia COM, (2003) 399/4 [hereinafter European Commission, A New Partnership]; 
European Commission, Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Part-
nership (Mar. 15, 2007); European Commission, Plan of Action to Implement the 
Nuremberg Declaration on an EUASEAN Enhanced Partnership (2007); European 
Commission, Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU En-
hanced Partnership (Apr. 27, 2012).
9. European Commission, A New Partnership, supra note 8.
10. Umbach, supra note 5, at 16.
11. European Commission, A New Partnership, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Heiduk, supra note 7, at 708.
14. The EC-Philippines Strategy Paper 2007–2013, Eur. Union, http://www.
eeas.europa.eu/philippines/csp/07_13_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT8S-85YS].
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Similarly, cooperation in the field of counter-terrorist financing has 
not been significant.  The EU seems to insist on the adoption and imple-
mentation of the current counter-terrorist financing regime, which was 
provided by the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention) 
and which has been promoted by international organizations such as the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  In this regard, the EU’s support 
of counter-terrorist financing has not advanced beyond the provision of 
financial or technical assistance to some ASEAN Member States (for 
example, provision of assistance to Indonesia in fighting terrorist financ-
ing and building judicial capacity).15
At the ASEAN level, while there seems to be a strong commitment 
to establish a comprehensive counter-terrorism regime, not much work 
has been done to deal with issues of terrorist financing.  Instead, individ-
ual ASEAN Member States have created and are developing their own 
counter-terrorist financing regime with the help and support, and under 
the guidance, direction and supervision, of international organizations 
such as FATF or the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-
style regional body for the Asia/Pacific region.16  These international 
organizations have made a significant attempt to diffuse and promote 
the existing counter-terrorist financing regime established by the Terror-
ist Financing Convention, FATF recommendations, and UN resolutions 
on freezing terrorist funds.  This diffused regime, which mirrors US 
counter-terrorism law, provides a wide range of tools in the fight against 
terrorist financing.  Criminalization and confiscation are two important 
legal tools which will be examined by this paper.
Criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offense 
is considered by the regime as the first and the most important step in 
countering terrorist financing.  However, this conceptualization (terror-
ist financing as an autonomous crime) suffers from a remarkable degree 
of ambiguity.17  Financing of terrorism, in its nature and under the gener-
al rules of criminal law, is a preparatory act which obtains its criminality 
from its connection with a terrorist act for which the financing is carried 
out.  However, in order to establish an independent offense of terror-
ist financing, there is no need (for the prosecution) to connect the act of 
15. Indonesia—European Community Strategy Paper 2007–2013, Eur. Union, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/indonesia/csp/07_13_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P899-2SNE].
16. Jason Sharman argues that anti-money laundering policies, which later 
were expanded to include terrorist financing, have been diffused in developing states 
“through the direct effects and indirect effects of power, rather than through rational 
learning, in response to brute material pressure, or to address local policy problems.” 
He argues that International organizations such FATF have directly or indirectly 
shaped the circumstances and fates of developing states in this area.”  “[D]irect coer-
cion, mimicry, and competition” are three mechanisms used to diffuse the measures. 
Jason Sharman, Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in 
Developing States, 52 Int’l Stud. Q. 635, 653 (2008).
17. See Hamed Tofangsaz, Rethinking Terrorist Financing; Where Does All This 
Lead?, 18 J. Money Laundering Control 112 (2015).
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financing to any terrorist act.  Otherwise, terrorist financing would come 
close to the concept of complicity or an inchoate crime.  In the absence 
of such connection, the main difficulty is where the criminality of the 
offense originates? The offense, as formulated, relies heavily on its men-
tal element to remedy this ambiguity—that is, a financer should intend 
or know that funds will be used for terrorist purposes.  However, it is not 
clear what constitutes ‘terrorist purposes.’ This ambiguity is further com-
plicated by the lack of agreement on a generic definition of terrorism. 
Thus, it is not clear what ‘terrorist purposes’ refer to, even though this is 
the main basis for the attribution of guilt to the accused.
Similarly, having terrorist purposes is the main basis for the seizure 
and confiscation of suspected funds; that is, the accused’s funds and prop-
erty can be forfeited on the basis of an assumption that the funds may 
be used for terrorist purposes, and this is not necessarily an actual use of 
funds for a criminal act.  The freezing of the assets of those listed by the 
UN Security Council or UN Member States as terrorists, terrorist orga-
nizations, terrorist associates or terrorist financers does not require proof 
of the terrorist purposes of the possessors or owners of these assets.  As 
soon as a person is suspected, he or she is announced a terrorist, and all 
of his or her assets are frozen, without the right to be heard, right to be 
presumed innocent, or the right of appeal.
Under such a vague regime, it is uncertain how the existing count-
er-terrorist financing regime can maintain and promote those fundamental 
principles (human rights, rule of law, social justice, etc.) that the EU in its 
dialogues with ASEAN has laid particular stress on.  My research aims 
to explore the approach of the EU, a value-based community, in adopt-
ing and implementing current counter-terrorist financing measures.  I will 
also determine whether and how the EU has addressed the ambiguity 
and issues inherent in the counter-terrorist financing regime, and wheth-
er EU laws and policies on criminalization and confiscation of terrorist 
financing offer a regional model for ASEAN to emulate.
This paper is divided into three main parts.  The first part will 
explore the history of the development of confiscation regulation.  It will 
illustrate how the concept of confiscation has evolved and will discuss 
the influence of the US in the formation of the current freezing and con-
fiscation regime.  The second part will show how the regime has been 
implemented by individual ASEAN Member States (Singapore, Malay-
sia, Indonesia and Singapore).  The regulatory problems and human rights 
issues arising from the implementation of the regime will be discussed. 
In the final and main part of this paper, EU’s law and policies on crim-
inalization and confiscation will be assessed.  I will examine thoroughly 
how the EU and its individual Member States have addressed those reg-
ulatory problems arising from the poor conceptualization of the offense 
of terrorist financing and from the implementation of the freezing and 
confiscation of terrorist funds.  I will also show that the EU has adopt-
ed and implemented the terrorist financing measures without seriously 
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addressing these issues.  This has resulted in the extreme overreach of the 
forfeiture laws and policies.  I will conclude that the EU’s and its Member 
States’ approach in criminalizing terrorist offence and confiscating ter-
rorist funds is in many respects in contradiction with the their policy and 
emphasis on the protection and promotion of human rights, rule of law, 
democratic values and good governance.  Therefore, the EU seems to be 
a poor model for ASEAN to follow.
I. A Brief History of the Development of Forfeiture 
Legislation
There is a lengthy history behind the States’ power of seizure and 
forfeiture,18 which is beyond the scope of this paper.  But in order to 
understand the complexity and function of modern forfeiture law, it is 
important to briefly introduce the historical concepts that it is based on. 
The history of English law in particular has had a significant influence 
on the current and increasingly globalized laws on confiscation.  A clos-
er look reveals that the basis of our current drug-forfeiture regime is an 
ugly reconstruction of ancient abolished concepts.  As it will be illustrat-
ed, the expansion of this regime to include terrorist funds has created a 
draconian forfeiture regime.
A. Ancient Concepts of Forfeiture
Asset seizure and forfeiture have existed as legal hybrids of crimi-
nal and civil penalties for thousands of years.19  They were rooted in the 
ancient concepts of “corruption of blood” and “deodand.”  Until 1840, a 
person in England who was convicted of treason or a felony and who was 
sentenced to death was subject to “the automatic extinction of his civil 
rights . . . including the right to hold, inherit or dispose of property”20 (for-
feiture of estate).  The confiscated objects did not need to be connected 
to an offense, but were confiscated simply because the crime was regard-
ed as “a breach of the offender’s fealty to his lord.”21
18. Nowadays and in this paper, the terms confiscation and forfeiture are used 
interchangeably.  But traditionally and literally, “the subject matter of forfeiture is 
generally specific property immediately connected with the commission of an of-
fence.  Confiscation is a more modern term often used, in contradiction to forfeiture, 
to denote deprivation of an offender of assets being the proceeds, or profits of crime.” 
However, the difference between these terms is blurred as in many legal national and 
international legal laws, the term forfeiture includes confiscation of proceeds of crime. 
Brent Fisse, Forfeiture, Confiscation and Sentencing, in The Money Trail: Confisca-
tion of Proceeds of Crime, Money Laundering and Cash Transaction Reporting 
109 (Brent Fisse, David Fraser & Graeme Coss eds., 1992).
19. David Fraser, Lawyers, Guns and Money; Economics and Ideology on the 
Money Trail, in The Money Trail: Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime, Money Laun-
dering and Cash Transaction Reporting 51 (Brent Fisse, David Fraser & Graeme 
Coss eds., 1992).
20. Arie Freiberg, Criminal Confiscation, Profit and Liberty, 25 Austl. & N.Z. J. 
Criminology 44, 46 (1992).
21. Id.
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The concept of deodand, which meant a “thing forfeited, presum-
ably to God for the good of community, but in reality to the English 
crown,”22 also permitted confiscation when an inanimate object was the 
cause of the death of any reasonable creature.  The Biblical example of 
this is a “goring ox” sentenced to death by stoning for killing a man.23  A 
similar notion formed the basis of confiscation in ancient Greece, where 
it was believed that “inanimate objects [which caused death] had per-
sonalities and could be possessed by Erinys, the Furies,” and had to be 
banished.24  Confiscation in this form proceeded on the fiction that if the 
object was guilty, it should be held forfeit as a dangerous thing which had 
to be removed from circulation.  The foundations of the modern con-
fiscation law seem to be based on this notion, allowing governments to 
confiscate guns, cars with concealed compartments that are used for drug 
smuggling, or electronic devices used for child pornography even in the 
absence of a conviction.25
Even by thirteenth century, when the law of deodands was trans-
formed for more practical purposes into a revenue producing function, 
the same practice was followed.  Thus “[an] animal that killed a person, 
the wheel of a water mill that crushed him, and the cart that ran over 
him” were all confiscated to the Crown as deodands (or an equivalent 
value in money was paid to the Crown), as the Crown was responsible 
for keeping the peace that was disturbed by the death.26  Interestingly, 
a similar analogy was used by the US government when it sued the rifle 
used to assassinate President Kennedy, forfeiting the gun for public as 
compensation.27
The law of deodands survived the Reformation by its justification 
as a deterrent against misfortunes.  It was argued that accidental deaths 
“are in part owning to negligence of the owner, and therefore he is prop-
erly punished by such forfeiture.”28  Deodands would presumably result 
in better care on the part of the owner.
However, in the nineteenth century, the increase in the frequency of 
deaths, which resulted from industrialization, urbanism and the develop-
ment of the railroad, and which required the provision of a remedy to the 
victims’ survivors (instead of confiscation to God or the Crown), necessi-
tated the consideration of an alternative to deodands.29  The Crown also 
22. Leonard W. Levy, A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property 7 
(1996).
23. Exodus 21:28: “If a bull gores a man or woman to death, the bull is to be 
stoned to death, and its meat must not be eaten.”
24. Levy, supra note 22 at 9.
25. Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 55 
U.S. Attys’ Bull. 8. (2007).
26. Levy, supra note 22, at 13.
27. United States v. One 6.5 Mm. Mannlicher-Carcano Military Rifle, 250 F. 
Supp. 410, 414 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
28. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 301 (1765).
29. Levy, supra note 22, at 11–12.
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lost interest in deodands “as it was increasingly ineffective as a source of 
revenue and the Crown found that it could more effectively raise revenue 
by taxation than forfeiture.”30
Therefore, from 1870 to 1980, a series of statutory forfeitures were 
enacted that “paved the way for the reversion of wrongful death to the 
realm of civil tort law”31 but also restricted the scope of the law of deo-
dands in a way that acknowledged the right of victim’s survivors to 
compensation and withdrew the Crown or King from “direct concern as 
an ‘injured’ party.” 32 Even in cases of felonious homicide (the equivalent 
of intentional murder today), the confiscation of a convicted felon’s prop-
erty to the Crown was replaced with other penalties, such as deprivation 
of life and liberty.33
Although these statutory forfeitures sought to abolish the deodands 
and the corruption of blood, they had a clear bias for protecting Crown 
or state revenue, the health and safety of community, and the quality of 
its products.34  Therefore, they were based on objective criminal liability, 
which “allowed little scope for distinguishing culpability on the basis of 
subjective states of mind.”35  In other words, as Freiberg says, these
Statutory forfeitures proliferated together with regulatory offences 
to create and support the modern administrative state.  As a gener-
al rule, the collective interest in conviction took precedence over the 
concept of personal guilt.  It is this social defence of forfeiture law 
which partly explain[s] . . . the Draconian overreach of the modern 
forfeiture law.36
This also proved to be a landmark, “opening up an entirely new realm 
of the criminal law, namely that which has come to be known as ‘Public 
Welfare Offences,’”37 a type of offense that does not require any men-
tal element.38  So it was not surprising that after the abolition of the law 
of deodands and corruption of blood, the early statutory forfeitures 
such as admiralty (maritime) laws39 included cases where, for example, 
30. Freiberg, supra note 20, at 47.
31. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deo-
dands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 Temp. L. 
Q. 169, 198 (1973).
32. In 1846, the Parliament in England enacted the Act for the Compensation 
the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents.  See id. at 198.
33. With the enactment of Forfeiture Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23 (1870) in En-
gland, forfeiture for treason and felony was abolished.  In the US, the Act of April 20, 
1790, 1 St. 117, ch. 9, sec. 24, codified 18 U.S.C. § 3563, abolished forfeiture of estate and 
corruption of blood, including treason and felony cases.
34. Regina v. Woodrow, (1846) 15 M. & W. 403, 409–13.
35. Freiberg, supra note 20, at 47.
36. Id.
37. Finkelstein, supra note 31, at 198.
38. Finkelstein refers to decision of the court in the case Regina v. Woodrow, 15 
M. & W. 403 (1846) as a landmark.  The court ruled that “forfeiture may be incurred 
even in circumstances where there was no intention of fraud and the in the absence of 
the word “knowingly from the statute forfeiture.”  Id. at 199.
39. See e.g., Navigation Acts of the mid-17th century in England remained in 
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ships should be forfeited without inquiry into the guilt of the owner for 
slave-trafficking, piracy and rum-running.40  Similarly, customs and rev-
enue statutes41 allowed the forfeiture of land used in the operation of 
illegal tax-delinquent distilleries.42
B. Forfeiture Laws in the War on Drugs: The US Approach
Despite this repressive character, the power of statutory forfeitures 
began to appear “inadequate” in the fight against what were character-
ized as the two growing problems of the second half of the twentieth 
century—drugs and organized crime.43  In the 1970s in the US, where 
the well-springs of both problems arose and where remedies crystalized 
into a model for other countries to follow, a loud call for an attack on 
(what Naylor calls the exaggerated and mythical)44 wealth of drug-af-
filiated organized crime groups was issued.  They were considered “as a 
particular danger” as they “threatened the governmental process, deplet-
ed the public purse and subverted and nullified the political process 
through graft and corruption.”45  The fear was also instilled in the pub-
lic that organized crime wealth could be used to take over legitimate 
business activities.46  It was whispered that the existing confiscatory laws, 
which authorized only in rem actions against contraband or articles put 
to illegal use (in other words, the instrumentalities of a crime),47 lacked 
deterrent efficiency because they were not able to put criminal organiza-
tions out of business.  President Nixon said, “[a]s long as the property of 
organized crime remains, new leaders will step forward to take the place 
of those we jail.”48  Thus, a demand rose for new weapons and tools which 
could permit the government to strike at the mafia’s source of revenue.
place in England, requiring that any ships importing or exporting goods from England 
ports fly under the England flag.  If the Acts were violated, the ships or the cargo could 
be seized and forfeited to the crown regardless of the guilt or innocence of the owner.
40. See e.g., United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890); United States v. Brig 
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 209, 233 (1844).
41. For example, Act of July 13, 1866, Chapter. 184, Section. 14 (14 U.S stat.) did 
not limit the scope of seizure and forfeiture of the properties used for fraud to the 
guilty mind of the owner.  So the property used for the commission of a crime could 
be forfeited in a civil action only if the lessee had the intention to commit the crime.
42. See Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
43. Freiberg, supra note 20, at 47.
44. Naylor argues that “every rational assessment indicates that the sums of 
criminal money supposedly involved are grossly exaggerated.”  See R.T. Naylor, 
Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy 
18–19, 134 (2002).
45. Freiberg, supra note 20, at 48.
46. Naylor, supra note 44, at 34–35.
47. For example, the Contraband Seizer Act of 1939 and its amendment in 1950 
restricted confiscation to instruments and properties used in drug trafficking.  Contra-
band Seizure Act, 53 Stat. 1291 (1939).
48. See U.S Congress, Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings, 
Ninety-First Congress, First Session 44–50 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969).
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As a result, new legislation under Title IX of the Organized Crime 
Control Act 1970, known as RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act of 1970), was enacted to proscribe the use of dirty 
money acquired and maintained through racketeering for the legal 
acquisition or operation of a legitimate enterprise by organized groups. 
This legislation, as well as subsequent legislation49 intended to be civil in 
nature, adopted the principles of antitrust laws and applied it to the prob-
lem of organized crime.  In a radically innovative manner, it authorized 
civil actions against certain contraband or property used in the commis-
sion of a narcotic crime or acquired from it by imposing a lower standard 
of proof (balance of probabilities) as well as greater powers of investiga-
tions in criminal cases.  However, forfeitures could not take place until 
after the conviction of an offender.
Within only a few years, these civil forfeiture laws were found to be 
unproductive because of their less extensive coverage and because they 
were “limited to persons convicted of participating in continuing crimi-
nal enterprises.”50  Accordingly, the US Congress extended the reach of 
the forfeiture statutes to include the forfeiture of all proceeds traceable 
to the purchase of a controlled substance as well as any negotiable instru-
ment or money intended to facilitate violations of the narcotics laws.51  It 
also “greatly expanded the potency and scope of forfeiture by authoriz-
ing in rem actions, which provide few of the constitutional guarantees 
that are attached to a criminal indictment.”52  This amendment, which 
included the relation-back doctrine, provided that all right, title and 
interest in property which is “used or intended to be used, in any man-
ner or part, to commit or facilitate” the commission of a crime giving rise 
to forfeiture would vest in the government immediately when the crime 
is committed.53  While the main purpose of this expansion was to close a 
potential loophole that would allow escape from forfeiture through the 
sham transfer of such a property to a third party,54 it was criticized mainly 
49. See e.g., the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, or the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91–452, 84 Stat. 922, which criminalized racketeering participation in commercial ven-
tures and allowed the civil forfeiture of all interests held in violation of the law.
50. Scott Alexander Nelson, The Supreme Court Takes a Weapon from the Drug 
War Arsenal: New Defenses to Civil Drug, 26 St. Mary’s L.J. 157, 159–60 (1994).
51. In 1978, this amendment added subsection (a)(6) to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) to 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
52. Nelson, supra note 50, at 160.
53. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881(h) (1988).
54. Levy shows that while the drug forfeiture laws were aimed at starving the 
drug organized groups of the profits of their crime, as soon as they came into effect, 
they were mostly used against “the little people.”  He also considers the forfeiture laws 
as a “failure,” pointing out that although they were aimed at preventing the criminal 
infiltration of organized groups into legitimate business, “very few .  .  . indictments 
involved the charge that the accused used the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering 
activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise.”  Levy, supra note 22, at 207.
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for its harsh results of shifting the burden of proof to the accused,55 and 
for allowing the forfeiture of property with scant regard to the innocence 
or guilt of the owner of the forfeited property, which closely resembled 
the long-abolished common law concept of deodand which allowed the 
forfeiture of property on the basis of the fiction of guilty property.56
Despite criticisms, the unjust expansion of the scope of forfeiture 
laws continued.  An amendment was added, which allowed seizure and 
forfeiture of the “substitute” assets of an offender (value confiscation), in 
case the offender could get rid of the property subject to forfeiture.57  This 
amendment was criticized for violating the Eighth Amendment protec-
tion against excessive, cruel and unusual punishment,58 and for violating 
55. Under civil forfeiture, in order to confiscate a property, the government 
only needs to demonstrate that there is a probable cause to believe that a substan-
tial connection exists between the property and the illegal activity.  For example, in 
United States v. One 1975 Ford F100 Pickup Truck, 558 F.2d 755, 756 (5th Cir. 1977), 
the government claimed forfeiture of a truck by only showing probable cause that 
the truck was employed to facilitate concealment, possession, or transportation of co-
caine.  Probable cause may entirely be based on circumstantial evidence, hearsay or an 
anonymous informant’s tip (without being tested in court), and it can be simply met 
by lodging a complaint by the government.  If the accused fails to prove the innocence 
of his property, or fails to prove he did not know his property was involved in illegal 
action, he will lose it.  In other words, as Levy discusses, in civil forfeiture, forfeiture 
proceedings are against property not a person, so “the property which has no rights 
is accused of crime and convicted on the basis of a showing of probable cause.”  Levy, 
supra note 22, at 124.  This turns upside down the presumption of innocence.  Property 
is guilty until the owner proves otherwise.  Levi further argues and illustrates that such 
lenient burden of proof on the government empowers the government with “draconi-
an forfeiture weapons” to seize and confiscate a citizen’s property without observing 
their constitutional rights and without insuring that “guilt and innocence is fairly de-
termined.” Id. at 117.
56. While the amendment recognized the “innocent owner defense” by allowing 
a party (owner) to plead that the crime took place “without the [his] knowledge or 
consent,” in practice, the controversy arises on what constitutes an owner defense.  Is 
there a defense when the owner knew about the illegal use of his property, but had not 
consented to it? Does a claimant need to demonstrate that the illegal use of his prop-
erty took place without his willful blindness?  See US v. One Single Family Residence 
Located at 6960 Miraflores Avenue, 995 F.2d 1558 (1993).  Several courts ruled that 
the claimant must demonstrate both that he lacked actual knowledge and consent, 
and that he did everything reasonably possible to prevent misuse of the property. See 
e.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783 (1988).  Levy ar-
gues that this reading was not satisfactory as it unfairly resulted in the rejection of the 
innocent owner defense of, for example, a woman who forfeited her car because she 
permitted her son, who had a criminal record for drug dealing, to drive her car.  Levy, 
supra note 22 at 164–65.  The son used the car for a drug transaction without his mom 
knowing or consenting to such an illegal use.  Nevertheless, the car was forfeited.
57. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
58. The forfeiture of substitute assets does not strike some as being fair as it 
could include the forfeiture of innocents.  Levy warns that such an amendment may 
make an honest shopkeeper forfeit his entire business “if he got mixed up in a single 
fraudulent scheme.”  Levy, supra note 22, at 116.  In the case of money laundering, such 
a forfeiture law can have unfair and dramatic impact on, for example, “a securities 
lawyer who prepares a prospectus which his clients, investment promoters, use to raise 
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the constitutional provision against the doctrine of “forfeiture of estate.”59 
The establishment of money laundering offenses, which some argue 
“was shaped not by a rational request for an effective way to deal with 
a well-understood problem but by a mix of myth, hyperbole, and deliri-
um,”60 greatly expanded the policy and scope of forfeiture by authorizing 
in rem actions against any property involved in financial transactions that 
represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, or that was 
involved in concealing and disguising the illegal origin of property.61  The 
most distinct feature of the anti-money laundering laws is their expan-
siveness; they include “over one hundred possible offenses including not 
only drug trafficking, but also such things as, fraud, espionage, and envi-
ronmental crimes,”62 crimes that do not have provisions which permit 
forfeiture of proceeds of those crimes.63
$1.5 million from investors in 2004.  Assume that the lawyer also allows his attorney 
trust account to be used to receive the funds and that he then transfers the funds to 
entities controlled by his clients.  The government, claiming that the lawyer knew that 
the prospectus contained material omissions and misstatements, brings money-laun-
dering charges, and a count seeking criminal forfeiture of $1.5 million, based on the 
lawyer’s transfers of funds he knew were obtained by securities fraud.  Assume that 
most of the lawyer’s own assets are represented by his home, worth $2.0 million, which 
he purchased in 1995 with funds he earned through years of honest toil well before he 
ever met the clients alleged to have conducted the 2004 fraud.  Nevertheless, because 
the lawyer transferred the $1.5 million in alleged tainted money to third parties—his 
clients’ entities—the government can list the lawyer’s home in the indictment as a 
‘substitute asset’ subject to forfeiture up to $1.5 million and can, in the event of the 
lawyer’s conviction, seek the forfeiture of that home if the tainted $1.5 million is un-
available.”  Richard F. Albert & Amy Tully, A Bad Fit—Criminal Forfeiture of Substi-
tute Assets, the Lis Pendens, 234 N.Y. L.J. (2005).
59. Traditionally, there is a constitutional requirement of a connection or nexus 
between the crime and the property forfeited.  Some are of the opinion that “the 
forfeiture of an equivalent value of substitute assets resembles ‘forfeiture of estate,’ 
particularly in the common case of the criminal whose property is traceable to illegal 
activity and whose illegal gains over time exceed the value of his current assets.”  See 
e.g., United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 806 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 10, 11 (1986) (cited by David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal 
Forfeiture, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 328, 344–45 (1988)).
60. See R.T. Naylor, Counterfeit Crime: Criminal Profits, Terror Dollars, 
and Nonsense 98 (2014).  Naylor argues that anti-money laundering regime in the US 
was shaped on the basis of some “erroneous or exaggerated beliefs“ about amount of 
money generated by organized groups, the durable nature and hierarchical structure 
of these groups, the purposes of these group to infiltrate into legitimate businesses and 
corrupt them, the financial motivation of these groups (as only motivation), and bank-
ers’ desire to be “the devil’s apprentices” (“an opinion reinforced by widely repeated 
stories about the misdeeds of Swiss bankers in particular.”) See R.T. Naylor, Criminal 
Profits, Terror Dollars and Nonsense, 23 Crime and Just. Int’l 27–29 (2007).
61. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986).
62. Scott Saltzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to 
Combat It, 63 Tenn. L.R. 143, 161 (1995).
63. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, supra note 61, § 1956(c)(7).
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C. Forfeiture of Terrorist Funds: A Reversion to Primitive Conceptions
Prior to 2001, some steps were taken to reform US civil forfeiture 
laws due to their constitutional challenges and unfair consequenc-
es.64  But the terrorist attacks of 2001 created incentives for the US to 
push forward the globalization of the assumption that there is a nexus 
between organized crime and terrorism.65  Consequently the US expand-
ed its forfeiture strategy to include the so-called financial war on terror66 
without regard for the differences between terrorist money, which nor-
mally has legal origin, and dirty money (proceeds), which is connected 
to an actual crime committed.  As a result, the USA Patriot Act (Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001)67 was adopted (or in the 
view of Naylor, “sold to the public as the necessary response”).68  The Act 
64. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act was enacted in 2000 in order to make 
a number of changes to the US forfeiture laws.  For example, the prosecution is re-
quired to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the property is subject 
to forfeiture” (18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A) (2000)).  Prior to this amendment, the govern-
ment could freeze a property on only probable cause (See supra, note 55).  The amend-
ment also allows the courts to “reduce or eliminate the forfeiture as necessary to avoid 
a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment” if “the forfeiture 
is grossly disproportional to the offense” (18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(4)(2000)).  Prior to this 
amendment, there was no balance between forfeiture and gravity of an offense (See 
supra, note 58).  However, as Johnson argues, these amendments failed to fully solve 
the problems that arose from the prior the forfeiture laws.  “[T]he Act fails to com-
pletely equalize the burdens of proof required by the government and innocent own-
ers.”  Also, “the amendment failed to adopt the proper inquiry under the Excessive 
Fines Clause and instead only uses a proportionality inquiry.”  See Barclay Thomas 
Johnson, Restoring Civility the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps 
Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 Indian L. Rev. 1045, 1084 (2002).
65. While the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (G.A. Res. 54/109 U.N. Doc. A/Res 54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999)), which was initi-
ated and drafted by the G8, was made to instil the idea that terrorism and organized 
crime are similar in terms of making and moving money, so similar tools to anti-money 
laundering regime can be used to counter it, before the 9/11 attacks, only four coun-
tries, not including the United States, signed the Convention.  The UN Security Coun-
cil (obviously by a US push) adopted Resolution 1373 (S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc S/
Res/1325 (Sept. 28, 2001)) which calls upon all countries to ratify the Convention and 
requires seizure of any funds directly or indirectly related to terrorism and terrorist 
groups.
66. Naylor argues that the idea of war on terror “heartily endorsed both by 
media pundits and by the growing army of post-9/11 ‘national security experts,’ did 
not emerge suddenly from the fevered mind of some Republication Party spinmeis-
ter.  It had been gaining converts for decades before it crystallized in the legislative 
and military aftermath of 9/11.  The anti-Mafia hysteria that had gripped the United 
States during the late nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries provided the 
images, the vocabulary, and even some of the important legal weaponry deployed in 
the anti-Islamic Terror campaign of the late twentieth and early twenty-first.”  See R.T. 
Naylor, Satanic Purses: Money, Myth, and Misinformation in the War on Terror 
46 (2006).
67. 18 USC § 1 (2001).
68. Naylor, supra note 66, at 11.
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was the result of the combination of two earlier strategies: the forfeiture 
strategy, which had been employed in the war on drugs, and a second 
strategy, which developed from the experience of economic warfare 
during and after World War I.69  The latter gives the government (spe-
cifically the President) authority to seize any property or transaction by 
declaring those who control the property or engage in the transaction to 
be an “enemy” of the State.70
The combination of these two strategies in the fight against terrorist 
financing resulted in the expansion of the scope of the forfeiture regime 
in an unprecedented manner.  The Act allows the seizure and forfeiture 
of “all assets” of people who, on a balance of probability, are shown to 
be connected, in any way, to terrorism; that is, the government can for-
feit “all assets,” foreign or domestic, of any individual or organization 
engaged in planning or preparing a terrorist act, all assets “affording any 
person a source of influence over any such entity or organization,” all 
assets “acquired or maintained with the intent and for the purpose of sup-
porting, planning, conducting, or concealing” a terrorist act, and all assets 
“derived from, involved in, or used or intended to be used to commit any 
[act] of terrorism.”71  The US forfeiture law also permits the forfeiture of 
any property collected or provided for terrorism without a need to prove 
any connection between the property and an actual terrorist act.72
Unlike the provisions on illegal drugs and money laundering, in 
which the forfeiture is limited to the forfeiture of assets derived from 
crime (in other words, the proceeds of crimes) or assets used or intended 
to be used for commission or facilitation of crime, the terrorist forfeiture 
provisions of the Patriot Act do not require “any substantial connection 
between the property and terrorist activity nor any sense that particular 
69. Naylor argues that this strategy began to be used to counter terrorist financ-
ing in the 1990s when “the Clinton administration started to apply the logic of asset 
freezes to designated groups rather than to countries.”  Id. at 10.
70. The Trading with the enemy Act of 1917, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95a–95b, gave 
the President the power to control over and impose restriction on trade between the 
U.S and foreign countries and/or nationals declared “enemies.”  In other words, this 
law allowed the seizure of the assets and property of blacklisted individuals or entities, 
domestic and foreign, controlled by or involved in trade or financial relations with the 
‘enemy.’ The power of the President was extended by the enactment of the Emergency 
Banking Relief Act of 1933.  By the enactment of the 1977 International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, such power remains in force in times of war.  Two decades 
later, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (amended in 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(A), two lists of entities, designated foreign terrorist organizations and 
state sponsors of terrorism, were created.  This law imposed restrictions on financial 
transactions with these entities.  For a review of the history, see Laura K. Donohue, 
The Cost of Counter-terrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty 147–48 (2008); see 
R.T. Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting, 
and State-Sponsored Crime (1999); see also R.T. Naylor Economic Warfare: Sanc-
tions, Embargo Busting, and Their Human Cost (2001).
71. Patriot Act, 18 USC § 981(a)(1)(g).
72. Id. at 18 USC § 981(a)(1)(h).
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property be linked to any crime at all.”73  So, if the government shows, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that a person or a group of persons are 
terrorists, all of their assets become forfeitable.  Similarly, if it shows that 
assets are collected for a terrorist purpose, whatever that means, they are 
liable to seizure and ultimately forfeitable.
In other words, what makes an asset forfeitable is not its use for the 
commission of a crime or its illegal origin, but its attachment to the terror-
ist-labelled identity or terrorist intent of the owner or holder.  According 
to this approach, it is the identity or intention of an accused which taints 
all of his assets and consequently make them liable to seizure and for-
feiture.  This is the draconian reconstruction of the abolished ancient 
concepts of “deodand” (guilty objects) and “corruption of blood” under 
which the forfeited objects did not need to be connected to an offense, 
but simply were confiscated because the crime was regarded “as a breach 
of the offender’s fealty to his lord.”74  Similarly, in anti-terrorist laws such 
as the Patriot Act, terrorism in any form (even a thought) seems to be 
considered under US law as a breach of the offender’s allegiance to the 
state which expresses zero tolerance for the presence of people suspect-
ed of being terrorists or thoughts labelled as terrorism.  But unlike the 
forfeiture of the corruption of blood, which required an actual convic-
tion, and unlike the forfeiture of deodand which required the occurrence 
of some type of concrete wrongdoing, this terrorist forfeiture law allows 
the forfeiture of “all assets” of a person or a group of persons who are 
demonstrated on merely a balance of probabilities to be terrorists or to 
have a terrorist intent.  These identity-based and intent-based confisca-
tion rules have established one of the most repressive forfeiture regimes 
in the history of liberal democracies.
Furthermore, the Patriot Act also provides an alternative means to 
confiscate terrorist property.  It greatly increases presidential authority 
to freeze and confiscate the assets and property of blacklisted individu-
als or organizations by declaring them foreign terrorists (similar to the 
concept of “enemy”), without granting judicial review of the forfeiture.75 
While the owner of property may file a lawsuit if he seeks the return of 
his property, the burden is on him to demonstrate, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the confiscated property is not the property of sus-
pected terrorists.76
D. Internationalization of the US Intent-Based and Identity-Based 
Approach
The US identity-based and intention-based confiscation approach 
has become not only a model for much of what is commonly described 
73. Mary Michelle Gallant, Money Laundering and the Proceeds of 
Crime: Economic Crime and Civil Remedies 106 (Edward Elgar 2005).
74. Freiberg, supra note 20, at 46.
75. Patriot Act § 106.
76. Id. § 316(a)(2).
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as the Western world,77 but has also crept into international and region-
al conventions and agreements.  The Terrorist Financing Convention, in 
its Article 8, requires “the identification, detection and freezing or sei-
zure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the 
offences set forth in Article 2.”  The offenses set forth in Article 2 include 
terrorist financing offenses (collection and provision of funds) as well as 
terrorist offenses.  Emphasizing the criminalization of terrorist financing 
as an independent offense, which is by its nature a preparatory offense,78 
the Convention in Article 2(3) does not require any connection between 
the funds collected or provided and any terrorist act; instead, the ter-
rorist financing offenses also rely heavily on the intent of the accused. 
Reading these provisions together implies that the Convention obliges 
confiscation of any assets and funds that can be attributed to an imagi-
nary terrorist act, as well as confiscation of assets used or intended to be 
used for the collection or provision of funds for terrorist purposes.
In dealing with the issue of terrorism financing, the UN Security 
Council also adopted an identity-based approach, which has been said 
to “operate based on diplomacy and not due process.”79  Resolution 1267 
set up a committee called the “Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee” and gave 
it a mandate to create and update (without proper judicial process) a list 
of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with al-Qaida 
and Taliban (“Al-Qaida Sanctions List”).80  When faced with informa-
tion provided by the UN Member States and regional organizations,81 
the committee, which consists of the Security Council Member States, 
is obliged to make a decision by “consensus of its members” on wheth-
er a proposed individual or organization is eligible to be included in the 
77. See, e.g., Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 23 (U.K.) which allows forfeiture of 
any assets, collected, received possessed to be used for the “purpose of terrorism.” 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ch. 24 § 1 (U.K.), permits civil for-
feiture of cash and property intended for use for the purposes of terrorism, or proper-
ty that represents the property of a proscribed organization, or cash or property that 
has been found by a court as “terrorist cash,” without a need for criminal prosecution. 
The Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, C-46 § 83.14, allows a court to order, on a 
balance of probabilities, forfeiture of “property owned or controlled by or on behalf 
of a terrorist group,” and property that has been used or will be used for the facili-
tation or commission of a terrorist activity, with no need for connection between the 
property and an actual terrorist act.  The Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) 
pt. IV s, (Austl.), gives the Minister for Foreign Affairs authority to proscribe a person 
or an entity as terrorist, and to order seizure of the asset owned or controlled by the 
proscribed a person or a group.  Section 20 of this Act creates offenses for dealing in 
such a “freezable asset,” offenses such as holding the asset, using the asset, allowing 
the asset to be used and facilitating its use.
78. See Tofangsaz, supra note 17.
79. Cian C. Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule 
of Law, Modern studies in European Law 120 (2012).
80. S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 6 (1999), amended by S.C Res. 1452 (Dec. 20, 2012) S.C. Res 
1455 (Jan. 17, 2003), S.C. Res. 1526 (Jan. 30, 2004), S.C. Res. 1617 (Jul. 29, 2005), S.C. Res. 
1735 (Dec. 22, 2006), S.C. Res. 1822 (Jun. 30, 2008), S.C. Res. 1989 (Jun. 17, 2011).
81. S.C. Res. 1390, ¶ 5(a) (Jan. 16, 2002).
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List or delisted.82  It is clearly stated that “a criminal charge or conviction 
is not a prerequisite for listing as the sanctions are intended to be pre-
ventive in nature.”83  The Resolution, along with subsequent resolutions, 
requires all countries to freeze all financial assets of Bin Laden, Al-Qa-
ida and Taliban.84
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, this approach became 
universal with Security Council Resolution 1373, which addresses financ-
ing of terrorists and terrorist groups in a general way without adopting 
a list.85  While there is no agreement on the definition of terrorism, the 
UN Security Council asked all countries to adopt necessary measures, 
inter alia, to
[f]reeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources of persons [not limited to assets of Al-Qaida and Taliban] 
who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in 
or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and 
entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and 
entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated 
persons and entities.86
The Resolution left it to Member States to draw up and establish a ter-
rorist list other than the designated list created by Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee.  It set up the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor states’ 
compliance with this Resolution.87  This was subsequently endorsed and 
enforced by the EU, which will be discussed later.
Similarly, the FATF recommends the adoption and implementa-
tion of measures to freeze funds or other assets of terrorists, terrorist 
organizations and those who finance them in accordance with the Unit-
ed Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the 
financing of terrorist acts.88  It also recommends confiscation of “property 
that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the 
financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations,” “without 
82. Sec. Council Comm. Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 
2353 (2015), Concerning ISIL (Da’ esh), Al-Qaida and Assoc. Individuals, Groups, Un-
dertakings and Entities, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work. ¶ 4(a) 
(Dec. 23, 2016).
83. Id. § 6(d).
84. S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4(b) (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 
1390 (Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455 (Jan. 17, 2001).
85. S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
86. Id. ¶ 1.
87. Id. ¶ 6.
88. Financial Action Task Force, International standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, the FATF Recommen-
dations, FATF (Feb. 2012, updated Oct. 2016) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q86U-ND4U].
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requiring a criminal conviction,” and “even in the absence of a link to a 
specific terrorist act or acts.”89  It also recommends that
[c]ountries should consider adopting measures that allow such pro-
ceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a 
criminal conviction (non-conviction based confiscation), or which 
require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property 
alleged to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a require-
ment is consistent with the principles of their domestic law.90
II. Asean’s Response to Terrorism
Terrorism has received special attention from ASEAN since the 
1970s when a series of terrorist attacks occurred in ASEAN Countries.91 
In 1997, the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime called for 
the establishment of “clear and effective regional modalities” to com-
bat transnational crimes such as piracy, money laundering, drug tracking 
and terrorism, “especially on the aspect of information exchange and 
policy coordination.”92  In 1999, ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crime was adopted to establish an institutional frame-
work for ASEAN cooperation and coordination on transitional crimes.93 
With regard to terrorism, the 2002 Work Programme to Implement the 
ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime set out steps to 
be taken and measures to be implemented in order to enhance region-
al cooperation and coordination in the fields of information exchange, 
legal matters, law enforcement, training, institutional capacity-building 
and extra- regional cooperation.94  The measures set out by the Work Pro-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 12.
91. For example, the attack on the Shell facility in Singapore in 1974 by The Jap-
anese Red Army, or the takeover of Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1972 by an armed 
Palestinian group called “Black September,” or the takeover of the US embassy in 
Malaysia in 1975.
92. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Declaration on Trans-
national Crime, (Dec. 20, 1997).
93. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Plan of Action to 
Combat Transnational Crime, (23 June 23, 1999).
94. With regard to “information exchange,” a database of national laws and reg-
ulations on terrorism and international treaties and agreements was to be established 
by the ASEAN Secretariat.Tthe Secretariat was called upon to “explore ways for 
ASEAN to cooperate with ASEANAPOL [ASEAN Association of Heads of Police] 
and relevant international organizations concerned with terrorism matters to further 
facilitate sharing of information and analysis of critical intelligence information such 
as ‘modus operandi’ and offences involving terrorist activities.”  Ass’n of Southeast 
Asian Nations [ASEAN], Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Ac-
tion to Combat Transnational Crime, (May 17, 2002).  ASEAN Member States were 
required to exchange information on security practices, on technologies to detect and 
deter terrorist attacks, and on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movements 
and funding.  With regard to legal matters, the Member States were called on to work 
towards the criminalization of terrorism and to “provide information among each oth-
er and to the ASEAN Secretariat on the progress of their efforts to enact domestic 
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gramme have become the main framework for almost all of ASEAN’s 
responses to terrorism.
In 2001, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action 
to Counter Terrorism in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.95  The Dec-
laration cited terrorism as “a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, 
progress and prosperity of ASEAN,” which must be addressed through 
regional and international cooperation.96  The Member States agreed, 
under the Declaration, to undertake the following practical measures: 
strengthening their national laws and legislation on terrorism, calling for 
signing and ratification of all anti-terrorist conventions, enhancing “infor-
mation/intelligence exchange,” strengthening “cooperation at bilateral, 
regional and international levels in combating terrorism”, and deepening 
cooperation among their law enforcement agencies.97  In July 2002, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum also endorsed a statement on a set of finan-
cial measures to counter terrorist financing.98  The Statement committed 
Member States to enhance cooperation on the international exchange 
of information.99  They also agreed to implement relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions, particularly Security Council Resolution 1373, which 
involves making lists of terrorists and freezing all their assets and their 
associates’ assets.100
legal instruments.”  Id.  The goal was to establish whether or not there was a possibility 
of developing “multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, 
investigation, prosecution, extradition exchange of witness, sharing of evidence, inqui-
ry and seizure in order to enhance mutual legal and administrative assistance among 
ASEAN Member States.”  Id.  The ASEAN Secretariat was required to work and 
study “a regional operational convention or agreement on terrorism” and “a bilateral 
or multilateral mutual legal assistance agreement or arrangement to enhance cooper-
ation in combating terrorist acts and deliberating on various aspects of the issue in a 
comprehensive manner including its definition and root causes.”  Id.  With regard to 
law enforcement matters, the ASEAN Secretariat was made responsible for providing 
coordination and cooperation “in law enforcement and intelligence sharing on terror-
ism on terrorism” affecting Member States.  Member States were encouraged to make 
proposals” on training programs or conferences.  Id.  The ASEAN Secretariat was 
required to assist Member States in strengthening their national mechanism to com-
bat terrorism.  With regard to extra-regional cooperation, the “ASEAN Secretariat 
was made responsible for conducting “a study on how ASEAN programmes/projects 
could complement/support UN resolutions.”  Id.  The ASEAN Secretariat was made 
responsible for looking into “the possibility of inviting [and involving] the Plus Three 
Countries—China, Japan and the Republic of Korea—and other dialogue partners” 
in the war against terrorism.  Id.
95. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], 2001 ASEAN Declaration on 
Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, (Nov. 5, 2001).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ARF Statement on Mea-
sures against Terrorist Financing, (July 30, 2002), http://asean.org/?static_post=arf-
statement-on-measures-against-terrorist-financing-30-july-2002-3 [https://perma.
cc/2HQS-KK8U].
99. Id.
100. Id.
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In response to the Bali attacks, the 8th ASEAN Summit Phnom 
Penh issued the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on Terrorism, in which the 
Member States reiterated their determination and commitment to 
adopt measures outlined in the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism.101  At the 2004 Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Count-
er-Terrorism, Member States were asked to take more practical measures 
to counter terrorism.102  These measures included “the development of 
appropriate skills among prosecutors and juries to ensure sufficient 
legal expertise exists to deal with terrorism,” “a sufficiently broad range 
of offences in national law to prosecute and punish those responsible 
for committing or supporting terrorist acts, while respecting democrat-
ic values, human rights and due process of law,” sufficient legal tools “to 
confiscate the proceeds of crime, obtained through illicit activities being 
used to fund terrorist activities,” and ratification of UN anti-terrorism 
conventions and resolutions.103
In January 2007, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Convention on 
Counter-terrorism.104  The Convention does not provide a generic defi-
nition of terrorism or terrorist group, but it does make provision for a 
number of criminal offenses prohibited under the anti-terrorist conven-
tion, such as hijacking, hostage taking and bombing, which Member States 
agreed to treat as terrorist acts.105  The Convention requires the ASEAN 
Member States to ensure that these offenses, especially when they are 
“intended to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, are 
under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, phil-
osophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar nature.”106 
The Convention also requires Member States to cooperate to prevent the 
commission, facilitation, and financing of terrorist acts, and also to pre-
vent the movements of terrorist and terrorist groups.107  Fair treatment 
and conformity with international human right law are also required.108
Besides these regional efforts, a significant number of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and declarations have been agreed or made 
between ASEAN and other regional institutions or states,109 among 
101. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Declaration on Terrorism by 
the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, (Nov. 3, 2002).
102. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Bali Regional Ministerial 
Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, Bali, Indonesia, (Feb. 5, 2004).
103. Id.
104. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Convention on 
Counter-Terrorism, Cebu, Philippines (Jan. 13, 2007).
105. See id. art. II.
106. Id. art. IX.
107. Id. art. VI.
108. Id. art. VIII.
109. See e.g., Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], 14th ASEAN-EU 
Ministerial Meeting Brussels 27–28 January 2003 Joint Declaration on Co-opera-
tion to Combat Terrorism, (27–28 Jan., 2003), http://asean.org/?static_post=14th-ase-
an-eu-ministerial-meeting-brussels-27-28-january-2003-joint-declaration-on-co-oper-
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ASEAN Member States,110 and between ASEAN Members States and 
other countries, such as the EU, the US, Japan, and Australia.  Follow-
ing the same pattern as the ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation, these 
agreements re-affirm the importance of a framework for cooperation to 
prevent, disturb and combat international terrorism and terrorist financ-
ing through exchange of information, relationships amongst their law 
enforcement forces, training and consultations, and strengthening of bor-
der control.
A. Individual ASEAN Member State Approaches to Counter-
Terrorism Financing
ASEAN appears to have made a strong commitment to estab-
lish a comprehensive counter-terrorism regime.  However, there is not 
much work done at the ASEAN level to deal with the issue of terror-
ist financing, except for some provisions in the ASEAN Convention on 
Counter-Terrorism, which emphasize cooperation in the suppression of 
terrorist financing.111  Instead, individual ASEAN Member States have 
created and developed, and in fact are still developing, their counter-ter-
rorist financing regime with the help (or perhaps under the pressure)112 
of international organizations such as FATF or the Asia/Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering (a FATF-style regional body for the Asia/Pacif-
ic region).113  These international organizations are making a significant 
attempt to diffuse and promote the existing counter-terrorist financing 
regime established by the Terrorist Financing Convention, FATF recom-
mendations and UN resolutions.  However, such diffusion seems to be 
problematic as the concept of terrorist financing is being touted while 
still ambiguous.
ation-to-combat-terrorism-2 [https://perma.cc/YCF7-5W9Z]; Ass’n of Southeast Asian 
Nations [ASEAN] ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat 
International Terrorism (July 1, 2004); ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation 
to Combat International Terrorism, (Aug. 1, 2002), http://asean.org/?static_post=a-
sean-united-states-of-america-joint-declaration-for-cooperation-to-combat-interna-
tional-terrorism-bandar-seri-begawan-1-august-2002 [https://perma.cc/T7W3-U8BK].
110. See e.g., Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Agreement on In-
formation Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures, Indon.-Ma-
lay-Phil., May 7, 2002, http://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/17346.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RGZ3-24WZ].
111. ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, supra note 104, art. 6.
112. See, e.g., Chat Le Nguyen, The International Anti-Money Laundering Re-
gime and Its Adoption by Vietnam, 4 Asian J. Int’l L. 197 (2014).
113. Sharman, supra note 16, at 653.  Jason Sharman argues that anti-money laun-
dering policies, which later was expanded to include terrorist financing, have been 
diffused in developing states “through the direct effects and indirect effects of power, 
rather than through rational learning, in response to brute material pressures, or to 
address local policy problems.”  He argues that International organizations such FATF 
have directly or indirectly shaped the circumstances and fates of developing states in 
this area.”  “Direct coercion, mimicry, and competition” are three mechanism used to 
diffuse the measures.
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A key component of the regime is to establish terrorist financing 
as an independent offense without regard for the fact that financing of 
terrorism, which includes financing of a terrorist act, a terrorist or a ter-
rorist group, is in its nature and according to general rules of criminal law 
a preparatory act which obtains its criminality from its connection with 
a terrorist act for which the financing is carried out.  However, no such 
connection is required in order to charge the autonomous offense of ter-
rorist financing.  The troubling question raised by the new definition of 
terrorist financing, which supporters and promoters of the regime over-
look, is that, if there is no need to link the act of financing to a terrorist 
act, what else can form the basis for imposing liability on those accused of 
terrorist financing? The offense, as formulated, relies heavily on its men-
tal element to remedy this ambiguity—that is, a financer should intend 
or know that funds will be used for terrorist purposes.  However, what 
constitutes “terrorist purposes” is also unclear.  This ambiguity is further 
complicated by the lack of agreement among countries on a generic defi-
nition of terrorism.  So it is not clear what “terrorist purposes” refer to 
even though it is the main basis for the attribution of guilt to the accused.
Similarly, having terrorist purposes is the main basis for the seizure 
and confiscation of suspected funds; that is, the accused’s funds and prop-
erty can be forfeited based on the assumption that the funds may be used 
for terrorist purposes, without the actual use of funds for a criminal act. 
The freezing of the assets of those listed by the UN Security Council or 
UN Member States as terrorists or terrorist organizations or their associ-
ates or financers does not even require proof of the terrorist purposes of 
the possessors or owners of these assets.  As soon as a person is suspect-
ed, he or she is declared a terrorist, and all of his or her assets are frozen 
without the right to be heard, right to be presumed innocent, or right to 
access an effective remedy.
The following section briefly assesses the laws of four ASEAN 
Member States (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) 
on terrorist financing in order to discover how these states have con-
ceptualized terrorist financing as an offense, and, in the absence of any 
requirement to link funds with an actual terrorist act, on what other basis 
they impose liability on the accused and freeze and confiscate their funds 
and property.  It also examines whether they provide any definition of 
“terrorist purposes.”  It examines their approach to freezing the assets of 
those listed as terrorists in accordance with the UN Security Council res-
olutions to determine whether they afford the listed persons and entities 
with their fundamental rights and due process protected by internation-
al human rights laws under the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.  It 
should be noted that the varied motives of individual ASEAN Mem-
ber States in adopting, implementing, or resisting implementation of 
these measures are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be dis-
cussed here.114
114. See Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, Regulatory Regionalism and Anti-Money 
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1. Singapore
There is a strong will in Singapore to fight terrorism and terror-
ist financing.  While Singapore has not been the victim of any violent 
attacks in recent years, it is situated in a region where several sepa-
ratist movements, guerrilla warfare and insurgency have been taking 
place.115  To prevent any possible threat that may endanger its citizens, 
sovereignty, and infrastructures, Singapore seems to have adopted a 
very broad definition of terrorism and terrorist financing.  Under Sin-
gaporean law, “terrorist act” means “the use or threat of action” where 
the action involves serious violence against citizens, endangers a per-
son’s life, involves damage to property, involves the use of explosives, 
involves environmental damage, poses a serious risk to health and safety 
of the public, or disturbs any public infrastructures ranging from public 
computer systems, public transportation, and financial services to public 
security or national defense.116  Although this definition does not include 
all the acts criminalized under the counter-terrorism conventions (such 
as hostage taking), similar to the definition provided by Terrorist Financ-
ing Convention, such use or threat of action should be carried out with 
the intention to coerce a government or international organization to do 
or refrain from doing any act, or to intimidate a population.
Singapore’s Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act (2003) also 
defines “terrorist” as a person who “commits, or attempts to commit,” or 
participates in or facilitates the commission of, any of these acts.117 “Ter-
rorist group” means “any entity owned or controlled by any terrorist or 
group of terrorists and includes an association of such entities” as well as 
any entity designated by the UN or the government as a terrorist group.118
In defining terrorist financing, the Singaporean laws on terrorist 
financing do not require connection between the act of financing and 
an actual terrorist act.  In vague language, the law criminalizes a broad 
range of acts as terrorist financing offenses with a heavy (but particularly 
vague) reliance on the mental state of these offenses.  Under the Terror-
ism (Suppression of Financing) Act, a person is criminally liable if he or 
Laundering Governance in Asia, 69 Australian J. Int’l Affairs 144, 155 (2015). 
Countries may have different motives and reasons to adopt and implement interna-
tional conventions or to comply with their international obligations.  For example, 
it has been discovered that the key motive behind Myanmar’s adoption and imple-
mentation of anti-financial crime measures is to weaken the position of opposition 
groups and strengthen the power of the central government “over potentially disloyal 
groups.”
115. There is an Islamic militant group, called the Jemaah Islamiyah, in the re-
gion whose objective is to establish an Islamic state which comprises Malaysia Singa-
pore and Indonesia, Brunei and the southern Philippines.  The group was accused of 
planning to bomb the United States and local targets in Singapore.  See Ministry of 
Home Affairs, White Paper; The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, 
(Jan. 1, 2003).
116. Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act, § 2(1) (2003), (Sing.).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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she directly or indirectly collects or provides “property” or “financial and 
other related services,”
intending that they be used, or knowing or having reasonable 
grounds to believe that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the 
purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist act, or for bene-
fiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity; 
or knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that, in whole 
or in part, they will be used by or will benefit any terrorist or terror-
ist entity.119
Similarly, use and possession of property “for the purpose of facilitat-
ing or carrying out a terrorist act” also triggers liability.120  Dealing in 
or entering into any financial transaction related to property of terror-
ists constitutes a terrorist financing offense if the financer or facilitator 
“knows or has reasonable grounds to believe [that the property] is owned 
or controlled by or on behalf of any terrorist or terrorist entity.”121  A per-
son will be punished by a maximum of five years imprisonment for failing 
to disclose information about any of these terrorist financing offenses.122
The provision is worded broadly enough that there is no need that 
the financer intend or know of any specific terrorist act.  It is thus not 
clear exactly what a financer of a terrorist act should know or intend to 
be criminally liable.  How can a person finance a terrorist act when he 
does not know about or intend a terrorist act? What is the definition and 
scope of “terrorist purposes”? With regard to the financing of terrorist 
groups and terrorists, although the laws aim at cutting off all possible 
financial resources of terrorists and terrorist groups, they do not distin-
guish between guilty and non-guilty mental states.  What if a person, who 
knows the recipient is a terrorist group, engages in financing for lawful or 
humanitarian purposes, such as furthering the lawful activity of a group? 
Does knowledge of the identity of a person or a group justify criminaliza-
tion of any association with such a person or group?
With regard to forfeiture measures, based on this vague mental 
state, property can be seized and consequently confiscated.  That is, in 
Singapore, property is forfeitable if a court is satisfied, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the “property [is] owned or controlled by or on behalf 
of any terrorist or terrorist entity, or [the] property . . . has been or will 
be used, in whole or in part, to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act.”123 
Under this provision, property which belongs to, or is control by, the per-
son who finances terrorism or a terrorist organization can be forfeited if 
it is intended to be used for terrorist purposes.  In the absence of an actu-
al terrorist act, the main concern is how a court may order forfeiture of 
property when it is not clear whether (and how much of) the property 
forfeited would or could be used for the commission or preparation of a 
119. Id. § 4.
120. Id. § 5.
121. Id. § 6.
122. Id. §§ 8–9.
123. Id. § 21.
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terrorist act.  The issued is also raised: whether such forfeiture is fair and 
precise enough to distinguish a guilty mind from a non-guilty mind?
With regard to the implementation of the UN Resolutions, Sin-
gapore’s law provides that all assets of persons or groups who become 
designated as terrorists by the UN Sanction Committee are frozen imme-
diately by Singaporean authorities for an indefinite time until they are 
delisted by the Sanction Committee.124  Although Singapore has not yet 
established an independent terrorist list pursuant to UN Resolution 1373, 
Singapore has empowered itself to list a person or a group designated by 
other UN Member States and freeze all their assets.125  No judicial review 
would be required.  Instead, Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, which 
is not a judicial body, would assess whether the information provided by 
a designating state supports the suspicion that the designated person or 
group is involved in terrorism.  However, in the absence of intention-
al agreement on the definition of terrorism, and given differences in the 
perception of terrorist threats, it is not clear based on what standard or 
definition the information provided would be assessed.  What is obvious 
is that such an assessment is not carried out in a way to comply with the 
fundamental rights respected and protected by the international human 
rights laws and ASEAN Human Rights declaration, such as the right to 
be heard, right to be presumed innocent, right of access to judicial review, 
and right to property.
2. Malaysia
Similarly to Singapore, Malaysia has criminalized terrorist financ-
ing in accordance with the Terrorist Financing Convention and the FATF 
recommendations.  Any provision or collection of property and funds for 
terrorist purposes is illegal.126  Any involvement with the property of ter-
rorists and terrorist groups attracts criminal liability.  No definition of 
terrorist purposes is provided, but the definition of “terrorist act” includes 
broad classes of acts.  In addition to those acts regarded by Singaporean 
Law as terrorist acts, the Malaysian definition of terrorist act includes 
aviation offenses such as hijacking.127  Compared to the Singaporean defi-
nition, it also has an additional mental state requirement.  Such terrorist 
acts should be carried out “with the intention of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause” and of intimidating the public or coercing 
a government or intentional organizations to do or prevent from doing 
an act.128  However, there is no need for an act of financing to be linked to 
124. Monetary Authority of Singapore (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulation 
2002, §§ 7–8 (2003), (Sing.).
125. The United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulation, §§ 7–8 (Jan. 31, 
2003), (Sing.).
126. The Penal Code of Malaysia, §§ 130N, 130O, 130P and 130Q (2015).
127. Id. § 130B(1).
128. Id. § 130B(2).
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any of terrorist acts, so the offense relies heavily on the mental element 
of the offense (terrorist purpose).129
In terms of forfeiture, any property which proved to be “terrorist 
property” is subject to forfeiture.  “Terrorist property” is defined very 
broadly and includes
proceeds from the commission of a terrorist act; property that has 
been, is being, or is likely to be used to commit a terrorist act; prop-
erty that has been, is being, or is likely to be used by a terrorist, 
terrorist entity or terrorist group; property owned or controlled by 
or on behalf of a terrorist, terrorist entity or terrorist group, includ-
ing funds derived or generated from such property; or property that 
has been collected for the purpose of providing support to a terrorist, 
terrorist entity or terrorist group or funding a terrorist act.130
It is not clear, when there is no terrorist act, how a court may determine 
that the suspected property “is likely to be used to commit a terrorist 
act.”  What if the property owned or controlled by a terrorist suspect 
or a financer is not intended to be used for terrorist purposes (such as 
personal matters for a house where the terrorist’s family lives)? The law 
expands the scope of forfeiture, seemingly allowing civil forfeiture of sus-
pected property.  That is, when “there is no prosecution or conviction . . . 
for terrorism financing offence,” a court can order forfeiture of the prop-
erty if it is satisfied, on the balance of probability, that the property is 
“the subject matter of or was used in the commission of . . . a terrorism 
financing offence.”131  In the case of a bona fide third party’s (claimant’s) 
having interest in the forfeited property, a court should be satisfied that 
the claimant did not participate or engage in the offense with regard to 
which the property is forfeited; the claimant should also lack, at the time 
of the commission of the offense, “knowledge[,] and was not intentional-
ly ignorant . . . of the illegal use of the property, or if he had knowledge, 
did not freely consent to its illegal use”; in addition he should have done 
“all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of the 
property.”132  Under such requirements, a person’s house which is used, 
for example, by one of his family members for terrorist purposes is at risk 
of being confiscated if he fails to prove that he was diligent enough to 
take necessary steps in accordance to this law.
In the same repressive manner as the Singaporean approach, 
Malaysian law empowers the Ministry of Home Affairs to blacklist, and 
to order the freezing of assets of, those who are suspected of being terror-
ists or terrorist groups or terrorist financers, without undergoing judicial 
procedure and without respecting fundamental human rights.133  In other 
words, the Minster of Home Affairs may declare a person or a group 
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlaw-
ful Activities Act 2001, § 56(1) (2001) (Sing.).
132. Id. § 61.
133. Id. § 66B.
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to be a terrorist or terrorist group merely on the basis of information 
he receives “from a police officer.”134  As soon as he declares a person 
or a group as terrorist, all their assets are frozen, and provision of “any 
financial or other related service” to it is prohibited.135  Although the list-
ed persons are allowed to ask the minister to delist them, it is unclear 
how they may defend themselves when they do not know why and on 
what grounds they have been listed in the first place.  With regard to the 
UN Sanction list, the law allows the Ministry of Home Affairs to order 
persons and groups listed by the UN Sanction Committee to be desig-
nated as terrorists, and their assets to be frozen.136  It has been alleged 
that Malaysia has deployed these executive measures against the politi-
cal opponents of the government.137
3. Indonesia
Until 2013, Indonesian law prohibited only the financing of terror-
ist acts.138  By the enactment of new legislation in accordance with the 
Terrorist Financing Convention and FATF recommendations, the scope 
of the terrorist financing offense was expanded.  According to current 
legislation, financing of terrorism is an act of providing, collecting, and 
loaning funds with the intention, or in the knowledge, that they will be 
used for a terrorist act, or by a terrorist individual or a terrorist organi-
zation.139  While no definition of “terrorist organization” or “terrorist” is 
given, Indonesian law provides a very broad definition of “terrorist act” 
using ambiguous terms.  A person commits a terrorist act when the person
intentionally uses violence or the threat of violence to create a wide-
spread atmosphere of terror or fear in the general population or to 
create mass casualties, by forcibly taking the freedom, life or prop-
erty of others or causes damage or destruction to vital strategic 
installations or the environment or public facilities or internation-
al facilities.140
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 66C.
137. For example, the designation of “Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia” as a ter-
rorist organization was construed “as a bid by Mahathir[‘s government] to crack down 
on Muslim oppositions.”  The government claimed that the group had been plotting a 
number of attacks in Malaysia.  However, no charges were pressed against them.  See 
J.N. Mak, Malaysian Defense and Security Cooperation: Coming Out of the Closet, in 
149 Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order 
(Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya eds., 2004); see also James Cotton, Southeast Asia After 
September 11, in Globalization and the New Terror: The Asian Pacific Dimension 
192 (David Martine Jones ed., 2004).
138. Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the 
Eradication of Terrorism as a Law, art. 11 (2003) (Indon.).
139. Law No 9 of 2013 on Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Funding, art. 
4 (2003) (Indon.).
140. Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the 
Eradication of Terrorism as a Law, art. 6 (2003) (Indon.).
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This definition is also expanded to include offenses related to aviation 
security, explosives and firearms, and biological weapons.141  Unlike Singa-
porean law in which a terrorist act does not include activities undertaken 
by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties,142 any 
act which meets the criteria of the Indonesian definition of “terrorist act” 
is punishable even if it is carried out by “military or police.”143  Howev-
er, the law does not define critical terms such as “widespread atmosphere 
of terror or fear” or “mass casualties.”  The law also does not clarify that 
what constitutes the mental element of a terrorist financing offense in the 
absence of commission or preparation of an actual terrorist act.
In terms of seizure and forfeiture, the law also uses vague lan-
guage.  To freeze suspicious funds, it provides two parallel and competing 
mechanisms.  According to the first mechanism, a national authority (a 
prosecutor, a judge, or an investigator) may order the seizure of funds 
when it is known, or it ought to have been known, that they are used 
for the crime of terrorism.144  Under the second mechanism, an authori-
ty may seek a freezing order from the Central Jakarta District Court.145 
However, it is not clear if authorities can directly order the seizure of 
suspended funds, why they need to resort to the second mechanism and 
seek a court order.  While the suspected funds remain frozen only for 
30 days, it is not clear how and under what circumstances the freezing 
would turn into confiscation and whether confiscation of suspected funds 
should be followed by a conviction for a specific offense (criminal cod-
ification), or whether it can be granted in the absence of any conviction 
(civil confiscation).
In terms of issuing a list of terrorist suspects and ordering the freez-
ing of their assets in according with the UN Resolutions 1267 and 1373, 
the law empowers the Chief of the Indonesian National Police to submit 
an application to the Central Jakarta District Court, requesting the inclu-
sion of those identified by the Police as terrorist suspects.146  The Court 
then decides on each case within 30 days on the basis of the information 
and evidence provided by the Police.  In the case of the court’s permis-
sion to include the suspects in the list, all assets of the listed suspects will 
be frozen.  The listed suspects have a right to object to the decision by 
providing reasons for the objection to the Police.  In case the Police deny 
their objection, the persons can bring civil lawsuits in the Central Jakar-
ta District Court.147  This procedure of listing and freezing was criticized 
by FATF as it did not result in immediate listing and freezing of assets of 
141. Id. art. 8–10.
142. Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act, § 2(3) (2003) (Sing.).
143. Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the 
Eradication of Terrorism as a Law, art. 6–7 (2003) (Indon.).
144. Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the 
Eradication of Terrorism as a Law, arts. 22 and 23(1) (2003) (Indon.).
145. Id. art. 23(2).
146. Id. art. 27.
147. Id. art. 29.
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those listed by the UN Sanction Committee.148  After five years of being in 
the FATF’s list of “high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions,” in 2015, 
Indonesia adopted an “inter-ministerial joint regulation,” which allows 
the authorities to freeze the assets of those listed by the UN Sanction 
Committee within three days after they are listed by the Committee.149 
The assets remain frozen as long as the persons are in the UN Sanction 
list.150  In practice, the joint regulation deprives the listed persons of their 
right, given by the law, to object to their freezing sanctions.
4. The Philippines
Until 2011, the Philippines applied the general principles of crimi-
nal law in criminalization and confiscation of terrorist financing;151 that is, 
terrorist financing was regarded as complicity to a terrorist offense or an 
inchoate offense.  Thus, not only was there a requirement to link the act 
of financing to a specific terrorist act, but also, financing of an individual 
or a terrorist group would not be regarded as an offense if it was not car-
ried out for the commission or preparation of a terrorist act.  Confiscation 
was also limited to the funds and property proven to be used, or intended 
to be used, for the commission of an actual terrorist act.  However, by the 
enactment of the Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2011, the Phil-
ippines established an independent offense of terrorist financing in exact 
accordance with the FATF recommendations and the Terrorist Financing 
Convention.152
In addition, the Philippines provide a very broad definition of ‘ter-
rorist act.’ In addition to adoption of the generic definition of terrorism 
provided by the Terrorist Financing Convention, classes of acts, such as 
piracy, rebellion and insurgency, coup d’état and hijacking are also con-
sidered terrorist acts when they are “sowing and creating a condition of 
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in 
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.”153 
Unlike the definition offered by the Terrorist Financing Convention 
148. Financial Action Task Force, Public Statement, FATF (Oct. 24, 2014), http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/public-statement-oct2014.html#indonesia 
[https://perma.cc/77ZX-M9AN].
149. U.S. Dep’t of State, Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern—Indonesia; 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; 2016 International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) Report, (2016), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/
rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol2/253406.htm [https://perma.cc/3LDF-NTL]. See also Haeril Halim, 
PPATK Freezes Extremist-Related Accounts, Jakarta Post (Apr. 21, 2015).
150. For example, in April 2015, Indonesia froze 20 bank accounts claimed to 
belong to “Al-Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated terrorist groups operating in Indonesia.” 
See Halim, supra, note 149.
151. See Human Security Act of 2007, Republic Act No. 9372, § 5 (2007), http://
www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2007/ra_9372_2007.html [https://perma.cc/D93X-
3AX3] (Phil.).
152. The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2012, Republic Act No. 10168, 
§  4 (2012) http://www.gov.ph/2012/06/18/republic-act-no-10168 [https://perma.cc/
APE6-CGXB] (Phil.).
153. Id. § 3(J).
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based on which a terrorist act should be aimed at intimidating a popula-
tion or compelling a government or an international organization, under 
the Philippine definition, the cause of fear should be the consequence of 
an act, and it should be intended to coerce the government “to give in 
to an unlawful demand” (whether it is a personal, material, financial, or 
political demand).  However, there is no need to connect the funds col-
lected or provided to any terrorist act,154 nor is the definition of ‘terrorist 
purposes’ provided.
Despite this ambiguity, freezing and forfeiture can be granted not 
on the basis of the link between the suspected funds and an actual ter-
rorist act, but based on a fictitious assumption that they may be used for 
terrorism.  The law permits the civil forfeiture of funds and property that
are in any way related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism; 
or (b) property or funds of any person, group of persons, terrorist 
organization, or association, in relation to whom there is probable 
cause to believe that they are committing or attempting or conspir-
ing to commit, or participating in or facilitating the commission of 
financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism.155
This low standard of proof (probable cause) seems to allow the prosecu-
tion to request the seizure and forfeiture of the funds and property based 
on circumstantial evidence (and even legal fiction) such as hearsay or an 
anonymous informant’s tip,156 or based on a mere listing by the UN Sanc-
tion Committee,157 without a need to prove the actual guilt of the accused 
or the actual criminal use of the funds and property.  This also shifts the 
burden of proof to the accused to prove that the suspected funds or prop-
erty were not intended to be used for a terrorist act, which is not proven 
or planned at all.
In implementing the UN resolutions, executive authorities are 
empowered to issue freezing orders with regard to the property and 
funds of persons and entities listed by the UN Sanction Committee or by 
other UN Member States in accordance with the Resolution 1373.158  The 
funds remain frozen “until the basis for the issuance thereof shall have 
been lifted.”159  However, if the frozen funds are “related to financing of 
154. Id. § 4.
155. Id. § 11.
156. Id.
157. Id. Property or funds frozen in accordance with the UN resolutions can be 
forfeited, in a form of in rem civil forfeiture if they are “found to be in any way related 
to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism committed within the jurisdiction of the 
Philippines.”  The Philippine authorities emphasize that “a mere listing by the UNSC 
would likely be sufficient to establish preponderance of evidence and this to forfeit 
proceeds of listed individuals/entities.”  See also The Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism; Re-
public of the Philippines, ¶ 275 (June 30, 2009).
158. The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2012, supra note 152, § 11.
159. The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, supra note 157. The assets of 
the Rajah Solaiman Movement were frozen after being listed by the UN Sanctions 
Committee. It should be noted that the designation of this group was the result of a 
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terrorism or acts of terrorism committed within the jurisdiction of the 
Philippines,” the funds will be the subject of civil forfeiture.160
The listed persons are allowed to “file with the Court of Appeals a 
petition to determine to the basis of the freeze order.”161  However, it is 
not clear, even if a person or entity listed by the UN Sanction Commit-
tee succeeds in obtaining their delisting, whether the government would 
delist the persons or entities and unfreezes their assets at the cost of vio-
lating its international obligations.
III. The EU’s Approach Towards the Confiscation of 
Terrorist Funds
As a regional organization, the EU has incorporated the current 
terrorist financing measures introduced by Terrorist Financing Conven-
tion and the FATF’s recommendations into its counter terrorist financing 
strategy, but in a piecemeal way.  While the initial EU definition of ter-
rorist financing is in line with the definition provided by the Terrorist 
Financing Convention,162 there are constant amendments pushed forward 
to bring the EU laws in line with the FATF revised recommendations 
and UN Security Council resolutions.  For instance, the latest proposal 
for a directive on combating terrorism has pushed through provisions 
which requires EU Member States “to criminalize the provision of funds 
that are used to commit terrorist offences and offences related to ter-
rorist groups or terrorist activities,” including the new terrorist financing 
offense (financing of travelling abroad for terrorist purposes)163 intro-
duced by the FATF’s revised Interpretive Note to Recommendation 5 on 
the criminal offense of terrorist financing164 and by UN Security Council 
Resolution 2178 (2014).165
Regarding the relationship between terrorist financing offenses 
and its subsequent terrorist offenses, the EU laws on terrorism have also 
request by the Philippine government.
160. The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2012, supra note 152, § 11. Fol-
lowing the UN designation of the Philippine Branch of the International Islamic Re-
lief Organization, the Philippine authorities submitted an application to the Court 
of Appeals requesting the freezing of the funds of the designated organization. The 
Court within a day issued a freezing order. The frozen funds were forfeited after few 
months. See The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, supra note 157, ¶ 275.
161. The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2012, supra note 152, § 11.
162. Article 1(5) of “EU Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council” defines ‘terrorist financing’ as “the provision or collection of funds, 
by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in 
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of 
the offences within the meaning of Articles 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.”  Council Directive 2015/849, 
art. 1(5) (L 141/73) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL-
EX:32015L0849&from=EN [https://perma.cc/6S86-4YQG].
163. Id. art. 11.
164. Financial Action Task Force, supra note 88, at 37.
165. S.C. Res. 2178, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178 (Sept. 24, 2014).
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provided similar provisions to those adopted by the Terrorist Financing 
Convention and the FATF.  It has been repeatedly emphasized that “it 
shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence is actually committed.”166 
There is also emphasis that in dealing with terrorist financing offenses, 
“it is sufficient that there is knowledge about the use of the funds for 
purposes furthering the terrorist activities in general without there being 
a need to be linked to for instance a specific already envisaged travel 
abroad.”167  Nevertheless, none of these EU legislative acts and propos-
als defines what constitutes “terrorist purposes.”  This not only results in 
different interpretations, but also fails to satisfy the principle of legality.
It is worth noting that the EU’s definition of terrorism is very 
broad, including many criminal offenses, and it has hard-to-infer mental 
elements.  Terrorism according to Articles 1 to 4 of the Framework Deci-
sion 2002/475/JHA covers a list of violent acts168 which
may seriously damage a country or an international organisation 
where committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, 
or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to 
perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilis-
ing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic 
or social structures of a country or an international organisation.
However, the EU has provided a narrower definition of terrorist groups. 
Unlike the Terrorist Financing Convention which does not provide any 
definition of terrorist groups, and unlike the very broad definition of 
terrorist groups recommended by the FATF,169 the EU has defined a ‘ter-
rorist group’ as
166. EU Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, art. 3(3), 2008.
167. Article 15 of Proposal for a EU Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism, COM/2015/0625, 2015.
168. According to the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Ter-
rorism, art. 1(1), terrorist offenses can include “attacks upon a person’s life which may 
cause death,” attacks upon the physical integrity of a person,” “kidnapping or hostage 
taking,” causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport 
system, an infrastructure facility,” “seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public 
or goods transport,” “manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of 
weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research 
into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons,” “release of dangerous 
substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger 
human life,” “interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other 
fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life,” “threat-
ening to commit” any of the acts mentioned above. EU Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA, 2002.
169. According to the FATF, the term terrorist group refers to “any group of 
terrorists that: (i) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly 
or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully; (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts; 
(iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (iv) contributes to the com-
mission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose where 
the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the terrorist act 
or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act.”  See 
Financial Action Task Force, supra note 88, at 122.
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a structured group of more than two persons, established over a 
period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. 
‘Structured group’ shall mean a group that is not randomly formed 
for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need 
to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its mem-
bership or a developed structure.170
The EU Members States also do not share a common understanding of 
what (or what not) precisely constitutes terrorism as a crime.  For exam-
ple, while the German Criminal Code only criminalizes financing of 
serious violent acts “endangering the state” (meaning commission of a 
criminal offense against life within the meaning of Section 211 or 212 
of the Code or against personal freedom within the meaning of Section 
239a or 239b of the Code),171 the United Kingdom’s definition also covers 
violent acts “designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt 
an electronic system.”172  There are also noticeable differences in the defi-
nitions of a terrorist group provided by EU Member States.  According 
to the Spanish Criminal Code, for example, a terrorist group is construed 
to be a stable group formed by one or more persons, for an indefinite 
time, in collusion and co-ordination to distribute diverse tasks or duties 
in order to commit felonies, as well as to carry out reiterated commission 
of misdemeanours.”173  Compare this with Greece’s definition of terrorist 
groups according to which funding “a terrorist group is not a crime unless 
that group consists of three or more people acting jointly in order to com-
mit” a terrorist act.174
When it comes to the confiscation of terrorist funds, following the 
US approach and the FATF Recommendations, the EU uses its anti-mon-
ey laundering confiscation provisions to counter terrorist financing, 
without regard to differences between the proceeds of organized crime 
and terrorist funds.  It requires its Member States to confiscate “either 
in whole or in part, of instrumentalities and proceeds or property the 
value of which corresponds to such instrumentalities or proceeds, subject 
to a final conviction for” criminal offenses, including terrorist offenses 
covered by the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on combating terrorism.175  Reading this provision in conjunction 
with the provisions on the criminalization of terrorist offenses, which do 
not require a connection between terrorist offenses and an actual terror-
ist act, there appears to be an intent-based confiscatory regime in which 
people’s assets may be confiscated merely on the basis of what they (are 
170. EU Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, supra note 168, art. 2(1).
171. Strafgesetzbuch [SGB] [Penal Code] § 89a(2) No. 4 (Ger.).
172. Terrorism Act 2000 ch.11 § 1(1)(2) (UK).
173. Codigo Penal (Criminal Code) art. 571 and Sub-Section 2 of § 1 of art. 570 
bis. (Spain).
174. FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism, Greece, (June 29, 2007), ¶ 135.
175. Council Directive 2014/42/EU, art. 4 (L 127/39). See a similar provision in 
Article 3(1)(b) of Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA, 2005.
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assumed to) intend to do, rather than what they actually commit or plan 
to do.  But there is a noticeable difference between the EU laws and the 
US confiscation model.  While in the US, “all assets” of a person engaged 
in terrorism can be confiscated regardless of whether they have been 
used or intended to be used for terrorism, the EU laws seems to imply 
the confiscation of the assets (assumed to be) linked to terrorism or ter-
rorist purposes; that is, it appears that there should at least be some kind 
of connection, even if fictional, between the confiscated assets and terror-
ism or terrorist purposes.
A. Confiscation of Terrorist Funds at the National Level Within the EU
Although the application of the EU laws and regulations on ter-
rorism offenses at the national level differs in many respects among EU 
Member States, especially with regard to the definition of the elements 
the terrorism offenses, some EU Member States appear to have adopted 
approaches similar to the US confiscation model of countering terrorist 
funds (the intent-based model).
For example, in the UK where a number of terrorism offenses are 
set out,176 the collection or provision, possession and use of money or 
any property can be regarded as an offense if a person involved in any of 
these actions intends that the money or property should be used for the 
“purposes of terrorism,” or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may 
be used for such purposes.177  Where a conviction for any of these offens-
es is secured, the court may order the forfeiture of any money or other 
property which, at the time of the offense, the convict “had in their pos-
session or under their control, and which had been used for the purposes 
of terrorism, or [which] they intended should be used, or had reason-
able cause to suspect might be used, for those purposes.”178  Similarly, 
entering into or becoming involved in an arrangement which facilitates 
another’s retention or control of terrorist property is an offense; but, 
unlike above-mentioned offenses, the burden is on the accused to prove 
that he “did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the 
arrangement related to terrorist property.”179  If the accused fails to do 
so and is convicted of such an offense, the court may order the forfeiture 
of the money or other property to which the arrangement in question is 
related.180  Departing from the conviction-based approach, the forfeiture 
order may be extended to any money or other property “which, at the 
time of the offense, [the accused] knew or had reasonable cause to sus-
pect would or might be used for the purposes of terrorism,” or was, at that 
time, intended by them to be used for those purposes.”181  Basically, what 
the prosecution needs to prove is that the accused had terrorist purposes 
176. Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), supra note 172, §§ 11–13, 55–58.
177. Id. §§ 15–16.
178. Id. § 23(1)(2)(3).
179. Id. § 18.
180. Id. § 23(5).
181. Id. § 23(4).
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when he became involved in those financing activities.  If they can, not 
only is the property involved in those activities subject to forfeiture, but 
in addition, other property of the financer, which can be assumed to be 
used for terrorist purposes, can be unfairly in danger of forfeiture.  This 
is despite the lack of relevance if the prosecution alleges that those prop-
erties could be used, or were intended to be used, for terrorism purposes. 
One example would be the forfeiture of property house belonging to a 
person who used his shop for supporting terrorism, simply because the 
house also might be used, or there is reasonable cause to suspect it might 
be used, for terrorist purposes.  In other words, by proving that the financ-
er had a terrorist purpose when he was using his shop for fund-raising, 
the prosecution could ask for the forfeiture of the financer’s other prop-
erty as it could be used for terrorist purposes.182
English law also allows courts to order the forfeiture of a proper-
ty not intended or suspected for use in terrorism when that property was 
“wholly or partly, and directly or indirectly .  .  . received by any person 
as a payment or other reward” in connection with any offense men-
tioned above.183  Thus, for example, the payment made to an accountant 
for preparing accounts on behalf of a proscribed organization is forfeit-
able whether or not the money was intended or suspected for use in 
terrorism.184
Forfeiture can be also issued in English law on conviction for spec-
ified offenses, such as weapon training, possessing things and collecting 
information for the purposes of terrorism, training for terrorism, or 
any ancillary offense to these offenses, or for offenses where a “terror-
ist connection” exists.185  Such a forfeiture order may be made against 
“any money or other property that was, at the time of the offense, in the 
possession or under control of the convict where it had been used for 
the purposes of terrorism, or .  .  . was intended for such use.”186  In the 
same manner, property under the control or in the possession of a person 
convicted of supporting (this is not limited to the provision of money) 
a proscribed group can be forfeited if, on a balance of probability, it is 
shown that it has been used in connection with the activities of the group 
182. In spite of such a law, in Regina. v. Farooqi & Others, [2013] EWCA Crim 
1649 (U.K.), the first attempt to forfeit the residential property of Farooqi (an Islamic 
bookstall owner) failed. He received four life sentences for soliciting to murder, for 
dissemination of terrorist publications, and for engaging in conduct in preparation for 
acts of terrorism. Although the judge (Sir Richard Henriques QC) pointed out that 
the law allows the court to forfeit the house, he rejected to order the forfeiture of the 
convict’s home on the grounds that “it would make Farooqi’s ‘wholly innocent’ fam-
ily homeless.”  Martin Evans, Terrorist Is Allowed to Keep His Home as Bid to Seize 
Property Fails, Telegraph (May 23, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
terrorism-in-the-uk/10852503/Terrorist-is-allowed-to-keep-his-home-as-bid-to-seize-
property-fails.html [https://perma.cc/J8G4-5EZF].
183. Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), supra note 172, § 23(7).
184. Id. at Explanatory Notes ¶ 33.
185. Id. § 23A.
186. Id.
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or “the court believes that it may be used in that connection.”187  There-
fore, for example, a rented flat in which the convict collected information 
(which according to the language of this provision, can include watching 
video) on making bombs for terrorist purposes can be put in jeopardy of 
confiscation through its use as a venue for these activities in spite of the 
landlord’s lack of knowledge or consent about such activities.188
Modeled on the drug trafficking cash seizure scheme, English law 
also authorizes the seizure and forfeiture of “terrorist cash” (such as 
coins, postal orders, bankers’ drafts etc.) in a form of in rem civil forfei-
ture (without a criminal conviction).189  Thus, cash can be seized if law 
enforcement has “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that it is terrorist 
cash.190  However, this approach, in practice, can be problematic because 
unlike drug-derived cash which has a criminal background, terrorist 
funds have a criminal destination; so suspicious grounds for the seizure 
of such cash seem to rely more on fiction than on reasonableness.  These 
suspicious grounds can be anything which may possibly raise suspicion 
that the cash can be used for terrorist purposes, such as “the country of 
destination,” “material on the person’s computer’s hard drive, . . . combat 
clothing in the luggage of the courier,”191 the failure to convince the law 
enforcement officials of the purpose and reasons for carrying the cash, 
having links with terrorists or terrorist groups, or a previous conviction 
of the owner.  A court can order forfeiture of any cash, no matter how 
small the amount, when the court is satisfied, on the balance of proba-
bilities, that it “is intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism,”192 
without a requirement to identify a terrorist act which gives rise to the 
cash forfeiture.  However, from a classic criminal law perspective, it is 
totally unacceptable to forfeit cash only on the basis of the evidence 
which points to the status of a person (whom he knows or is connect-
ed to, or where he travels to), instead of a wrongdoing he might do or he 
already has done.
Similarly, in Italy, terrorist financing is no longer limited to the act of 
“financing associations.”193  It can cover any financing activity carried out 
for “purposes of terrorism” or “democratic order subversion.”194  While 
187. Id. § 111.
188. Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation 
87 (2009).
189. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, pt. 1(2) of sched. 1 (U.K.). See 
also R. E. Bell, The Seizure, Detention and Forfeiture of Cash in the UK, 2004 11 J. Fin. 
Crime 134.
190. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 189, at pt. 2(1) of 
sched. 1.
191. Bell, supra note 189, at 144.
192. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 189, at pt. 1(1) of 
sched. 1.
193. The concept of “financing associations” is not defined by Italian law; so, it is 
unclear whether it includes acts of collection, receipt or provision.
194. By adopting the LD N.109/2007 of June 22, 2007, Italy has broadened 
the scope of terrorist financing offences to include financing of terrorist activities. 
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the terms “purpose of terrorism” and “democratic order subversion” are 
not defined, it is not required that the funds involved in such financing 
are used or allocated for an actual terrorist act or an act aimed at sub-
verting democratic order.195  Therefore, a person who possesses, receives 
or provides assets or property to another person or an organization can 
be prosecuted and convicted for what may be assumed (understood) to 
be terrorist purposes or subversion.  In terms of confiscation, it seems 
that Italy has expanded its preventive system of seizure and confisca-
tion of mafia-type assets to counter terrorist funds, without considering 
the fact that mafia assets may be derived from illegal sources while ter-
rorist funds have an illegal destination.  A confiscation order can “target 
the assets of persons who (i) are linked to organized and non-organized 
crime; (ii) “habitually” conduct criminal activities . . .; or (iii) are suspect-
ed of funding terror.”196  Such confiscation is not limited to the property 
or funds proven to be “price,” “product,” “profit,” or instrumentalities of 
a criminal act; as the FATF’s report indicates, it can also include “assets 
or other property” of which the offender or the third party cannot justify 
its legal origin,197 and which, in the case of terrorist of terrorist financing, 
are assumed to be intended to be used by another person or an organiza-
tion for terrorist purposes or subversion of democratic order.  Therefore, 
the burden would be on the accused or the third party to prove otherwise.
In a similar fashion, the Austrian Penal Code allows confiscation of 
any property that is at the disposal of a terrorist organization as well as 
confiscation of all property within the possession of a person who is con-
victed of being member of a terrorist group.198  A person is considered 
a member of a terrorist group even when the person participates in the 
group’s activities merely by collecting or providing assets for the group 
with the knowledge that he promotes the association or its offenses.199 
The definition of a terrorist group has been expanded to include not only 
a group that engages or aims at terrorist act, but also a group established 
for the purpose of terrorist financing.200  Although this law has been rare-
ly applied as the prosecution needs to prove the elements of the terrorist 
organization,201 all property of a person who receives or collects or pro-
Financial Action Task Force, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing 
Measures; Italy, FATF 136 (2016).
195. While the Italian Penal Code is silent on this matter, Italian authorities point 
out to the FATF assessors that the offense of terrorist financing “refers to the alleged 
risk in order to prevent the result of financing, and anticipates punishability at a pro-
dromal time. Moreover, the Italian Court of Cassation has stated that the [terrorist 
financing] offense . . . is committed, without it being necessary that material execution 
of the terrorist act be actually set up.”  Id.
196. Id. at 59.
197. Id. at 133.
198. Financial Action Task Force, Mutual Evaluation Report; Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism; Austria, FATF ¶ 209 (June 26, 2009).
199. Id. ¶ 186.
200. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 278(3) (Austria).
201. According to § 278b(3) of the Austrian Penal Code, a group is considered a 
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vides funds for another group would be in jeopardy if the convict fails to 
prove that his property and assets do not have illegal sources (“member-
ship benefits”) or an illegal destination.
On the other hand, some EU Member States allow confiscation of 
terrorist funds in a restrictive manner.  For instance, in Germany, financ-
ing (collecting, receiving or providing of assets) of serious violent acts 
endangering the state202 does not constitute an offense if there is no 
explicit connection between the act of financing and a serious violent 
act.203  This seems to restrict the scope of the offence to an act of com-
plicity or an inchoate offence, which is different from what the Terrorist 
Financing Convention requires or the FATF recommends.  Under the 
German law, for an act to be regarded as an offense, assets involved also 
need to be substantial in the sense that they need to make “a greater than 
merely insubstantial contribution to the preparation of a serious violent 
act endangering the state.”204  Even when these requirements are met and 
a conviction is obtained, a confiscation order can be made only against 
the assets generated by, used, or intended for use in the commission or 
preparation of the terrorist financing offense or the terrorist act.205  The 
forfeiture cannot be directed at such assets if they, at the time of the com-
mission of the offense, were owned or controlled by the third party who 
did not provide his assets for the support of the offense “with knowl-
edge of the circumstances of the act.”206  On the other hand, the mere 
collection of funds for a terrorist organization207 is regarded as support 
of a terrorist organization.208  Unlike the offense of financing of vio-
terrorist group when the group is designed as an “union planned for a longer time of 
more than two persons aiming at the commitment of terrorist offences or financing 
of terrorism.”  Id.
202. A serious violent act endangering the state is defined as a criminal offense 
“against life .  .  . or against personal freedom” which is intended and able to impair 
“the existence or security of a state or of an international organization, or to abolish, 
rob of legal effect or undermine constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of 
Germany.”  Strafgesetzbuch [SGB][Penal Code], § 89a(1) (Ger.).
203. Id. § 89a(2)(4). See also Financial Action Task Force, 3rd Follow-Up Report: 
Mutual Evaluation of Germany 14 (2014).
204. Financial Action Task Force, Mutual Evaluation Report; Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism; Germany para. 209 (2010).
205. Strafgesetzbuch [SGB] [Penal Code], § 73–74 (Ger.).
206. Id. § 73(3).
207. A criminal group in German law is defined as an organizational combina-
tion of at least three persons, designed to exist for a certain period of time, where—
with subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group as a whole—the 
members pursue common goals, while standing in such relation to one another that 
they feel themselves to be a uniform cluster.  According to Section 129a(1), a criminal 
group is considered a terrorist group when such a group’s aims and activities are di-
rected at the commission of specific offences such as murder, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes or crimes against personal liberty.  Terrorist organizations are, 
according to Section 129a(2), those whose purpose it is or whose activities are aimed, 
for example, at causing serious physical or psychological harm to another person, 
computer sabotage, destruction of structures and so on. Id. § 129a(2).
208. Id. § 129a(5).
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lent acts, it is not necessary for the financial means to be used for the 
commission or preparation of a criminal act.  The collection or provision 
of funds only needs to be made “for an objective purpose for the terror-
ist organization and must be useful for it.”209  But since only intentional 
conduct attracts criminal liability according to German law, the prose-
cution needs to prove that the accused had the intention that the funds 
be used for support of a group whose aims or activities were directed 
towards the commission of violent acts.210  Consequently, forfeiture may 
be made against the assets proved to be intended for use of the purposes 
of the group, whether they are legal or illegal.  This can include support 
for humanitarian purposes.  A similar approach has been taken by some 
other jurisdictions such as Denmark.211
However, in Finland, contribution to a terrorist group may give rise 
to forfeiture only if the contributor is aware that his contribution could 
promote the “criminal activity” of the group.212  Similarly, in Switzerland, 
financing of a group does not constitute an offense and, as a result, the 
money involved is not subject to forfeiture if the financing is not made 
to support the group “in its criminal activities,”213 or if the financing is 
carried out “with a view to establishing or re-establishing a democratic 
regime or a state governed by the rule of law or with a view to exercising 
or safeguarding human rights.”214  But the question arises as to how a per-
son may know or have control over the end use of provided or collected 
funds by others (recipients of funds).
B. Ambiguity About the Mental Element and the Question of Liability
Although there are noticeable differences among EU Member 
States in the criminalization and confiscation of terrorist funds, there 
is a growing trend towards utilizing an intention-based criminalization 
and confiscation approach—an approach to targeting assumed terror-
ist funds based on the intention of the financer without linking them to 
an actual terrorist act (whether completed or only attempted).  As men-
tioned above, at the EU level, this approach has been adopted to impose 
209. Financial Action Task Force, supra note 204, ¶ 223.
210. Id. ¶ 223.
211. Danish Criminal Code, § 114a. The FATF’s report points out that “Explan-
atory notes to Section 114a, which provide details not contained in legislation and 
are considered by the courts to carry a high degree of legal weight, make clear that it 
is a punishable act to provide funds or financial services to both the legal and illegal 
activities of a terrorist group. Intent is required in relation to the fact terrorist acts are 
part of the activities or aims of the group. Participation in or support to an organiza-
tion that has both humanitarian and terrorist aims are covered.”  Financial Action 
Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism; Kingdom of Denmark para. 222 (2006).
212. Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889, amendments up to 927/2012 included), 
Chapter 34a, § 4.
213. Schweizerisches Strafgestzbuch, Code Penal Suisse, Codice penale 
svizzero (Criminal Code) art. 260 (Switz.).
214. Id. at 260.
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a criminal penalty in two ways.  In the more restricted way, practiced by 
states such as Germany and Finland, confiscation is limited to the funds 
and property intended to be used for terrorist purposes.  The broader 
manner, adopted by the UK, allows the expansion of confiscation to the 
convict’s other property which is not involved in financing but which is 
suspected to be possibly used for terrorist purposes.
Both these approaches depend on a mental element to impose 
confiscation.  However, reliance on the guilty mind of offenders raises 
questions in terms of the justifiability of this approach, and the scope 
and formulation of the mental element.  With respect to the justifiability 
of the approach, it should be noted that from a classic criminal law per-
spective, it is controversial to impose guilt on a person (and consequently 
confiscation sanctions on his property) merely on the basis of what the 
person intends without a link to any criminal conduct.  As the principle of 
mens rea implies, people “should be held criminally liable only for events 
or consequences which they intended or knowingly risked,”215 or pun-
ished for the commission or facilitation of actual criminal conduct rather 
than criminal thoughts or state of being (as principle of legality requires).
As far as the structure of the offense is concerned, there is confu-
sion over the formulation of the mental element of the terrorist financing 
offense.  In fact, according to the Terrorist Financing Convention, in order 
to establish an independent offense of terrorist financing, there is no 
requirement for any connection between the preparatory act of financ-
ing and the subsequent terrorist offense for which the financing occurs. 
Such a requirement would limit the crime of financing to the equivalent 
of an act of complicity in the terrorism itself or alternatively make it an 
attempt by the financer themselves to commit terrorism.  But, accord-
ing to the Convention, all that is required is the financer’s intention that 
funds should be used for terrorist purposes, or his knowledge that the 
funds will be used for such purposes.  This is enough to make his act of 
financing a criminal act and his property forfeitable.
However, what exactly should a financer of terrorist activity have 
known or intended to be criminally liable and be subject to confiscation 
sanctions? Unfortunately, both the Terrorist Financing Convention and 
EU legislation and directives have failed to set out a clear definition of 
what constitutes the fault element of the offense.  In spite of this ambi-
guity, the adaptation and implementation of this approach are required 
because it is assumed that terrorist financing is as serious an offense as 
terrorism and needs to be tackled (criminalized) independently,216 with 
heavy reliance on the offense’s mental element.  This ambiguity has left 
215. Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 75 (6th ed, 2009).
216. This notion is based on the assumption reflected in the preamble of the Con-
vention: “the number and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the 
financing that terrorists may obtain.”  International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism, Preamble, G.A. Res. 54/109, UN. Doc. A/Res/54/109 (Dec. 
9, 1999).
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the fault element of the offense of terrorist financing open to different 
interpretations.  The possible mental elements which different jurisdic-
tions read into the definition of the terrorist financing offense will be 
discussed in the next section.
C. Terrorist Intent and the Challenge of Human Rights
Before examining those mental elements interpreted into the defi-
nition of the terrorist financing offense, it is necessary to note that, as 
the Convention requires, adoption of any state of mind as a fault ele-
ment of the offense and as a basis for the imposition of criminal liability 
needs to be consistent with the relevant fundamental rights laid down 
in domestic and international human rights.217  Generally speaking, the 
validity of any confiscation measure depends on its compatibility with 
the laws safeguarding an individual’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
property under the human rights law.218  The European Convention on 
Human Rights219 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union,220 for example, rigorously protect the right to own, use, 
dispose of and bequeath lawfully acquired possessions.  The main pur-
pose of these laws, according to the European Court of Human Rights, 
is “to prevent the arbitrary seizures, confiscations, . . . or other capricious 
interferences with peaceful possession that many governments are—or 
frequently have been—all too prone to resort to.”221  However, the right 
to property is not absolute.  Both the Convention and Charter give states 
the right to interfere with one’s property under two circumstances: where 
it is precisely provided by law, and where it is necessary for the general 
interest.222  These two requirements are well explained by the European 
Court of Human Rights.
With regard to the former, which flows from the criminal law prin-
ciple of legality (no punishment without law), the European Court of 
217. Id. art. 17: “Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any 
other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention 
shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees 
in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present 
and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights 
law.”
218. Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, 
Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime 113 
(2003).
219. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, May 18, 1954, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
220. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17, Dec. 18, 2000, 
2000/C 364/1.
221. Marckx v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 6833/74, ¶ 20 (1979).
222. At the time of emergency “threatening the life of the nation,” states are also 
allowed to take measures derogating from their obligation to value the right to prop-
erty, “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.” 
See the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15.
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Human Rights has set two requirements: accessibility and foreseeability. 
The court ruled that:
the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to 
have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal 
rules applicable to a given case.  Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded 
as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable 
the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able—if need be with 
appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.223
As for necessary interference for the general interest, the question is 
whether and when in exercising their right to control the use of private 
property, states are acting in accordance with the general interest of its soci-
ety.  In order to manage disputes involving the property right of individuals 
and public interest, the European Court of Human Rights has commonly 
applied the proportionality principle.224  According to this principle, there 
should be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed in the deprivation of property and the legitimate objectives to 
be realized by the deprivation.225  In other words, legislation must strike “a 
fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the commu-
nity, which in the case of terrorist financing, is the prevention of the use of 
funds and property for terrorist activity, and the requirements of the pro-
tection of the individual defendant’s fundamental rights.”226
In determining whether such a balance is held, the principle implies 
three tests: “Whether (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important 
to justify limiting a fundamental right [reasonableness test]; (ii) the mea-
sures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected 
to it [appropriateness test]; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or 
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective [pro-
portionality test].”227
In applying these tests to counter terrorist financing measures, one 
must ask the following questions: (i) is financing of terrorism really “a 
matter of grave concern to the international community,” with regard 
to which regulatory measures limiting fundamental rights need to be 
223. The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 6538/74, 
¶ 49 (1979).
224. Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
allows limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Char-
ter on the conditions that they are “provided for by law and respect the essence of 
those rights and freedoms.  Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may 
be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”
225. Pressos Compania Naviera SA & Others v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 
17849/91¶ 38 (1995).
226. Jahn & Others v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R., Applications Nos. 46720/99, 
72203/01, and 72552/01 ¶ 93 (2005).
227. De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Lands and Housing, 1 AC 69, 80, (1998) (alteration in original) http://www.bailii.org/
uk/cases/UKPC/1998/30.html [https://perma.cc/MQJ9-7ZQU].
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adopted to prevent movements of funds intended for terrorist purposes228 
(reasonableness test)?; (ii) is the criminalization of terrorist financing as 
an independent offense, although preparatory in its nature, suitable or 
appropriate to achieve the given goal (appropriateness test)?; and (iii) 
would the imposition of liability and confiscation sanctions on the basis 
of guilty mind of the accused result in an excessive burden on the individ-
ual (proportionality test)?
Regardless of whether the counter-terrorist financing regime can 
survive the first two tests (reasonableness and appropriateness test), the 
proportionality of its measures depends heavily on the mental element 
to the definition of terrorist financing offense.  As mentioned above, this 
mental element would be the main basis for imposing criminal liabili-
ty and sanctions in the absence of a requirement to link financing to an 
actual terrorist act.  In order for any mental element to pass the test of 
proportionality, its consistency with the protected human rights needs to 
be tested.  In fact, any formulation of the offense should not be upheld 
as being consistent with protected right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possession if it, although necessary and suitable, does not precisely indi-
cate the scope of confiscation which might be imposed to those involved 
in financing.
A mens rea requirement cannot also be justified as being propor-
tionate if it fails, due to its broadness, to make a distinction between the 
innocent and the guilty.  In other words, legislation which purports an 
aim in the general interest of merely preventing those funds and property 
from being used for terrorist activity will be in violation of the protected 
right to property if it results in depriving individuals of funds and prop-
erty which are not proved to be used or intended to be used for such 
activity.  Such legislation cannot proportionally and reasonably enhance 
the purported aim and thus fails the proportionality test.
In the absence of a requirement to link the preparatory act of 
financing to the actual terrorist act, three possible forms of mens rea 
could be determined for the offense of terrorist financing: awareness of 
circumstances, general knowledge of a terrorist act, and knowledge of 
the identity of the recipient(s) of funds.  I have chosen these mental ele-
ments read by courts outside the EU and ASEAN into the definition of 
the offence because the matter, to the best of my knowledge, has never 
been discussed by any court or authority in EU or ASEAN jurisdictions. 
As will be illustrated below, none of these fault elements, however, seem 
to meet the requirements of the proportionality principle for two rea-
sons: either they are imprecise about what should be confiscated due to 
the fact that there is no actual terrorist act with regard to which a confis-
cation sanction is imposed, or they impose liability and penalty without 
any kind of guilty mental element on the part of the accused (financing 
of a person or an organization).
228. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
supra note 65.
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1. Confiscation on the Basis of Awareness of Circumstances
In the absence of a requirement to link a preparatory terrorism 
offense to an actual terrorist act, a court in Australia ruled that aware-
ness of a circumstance can be a sufficient ground for imposing liability. 
The court explained in Regina v. Lodhi that the fault element of such 
offenses can be demonstrated with respect to the act of preparation or 
facilitation without a need to prove that the accused intended to facili-
tate or contribute to either a specific act or a general terrorist act.229  In 
this case, the accused collected maps of the Sydney electrical supply sys-
tem, sought information about a price list of chemicals, and possessed 
materials containing general information about making explosives.  The 
court found that the accused was aware of circumstances in which these 
acts occurred.230  The court regarded the accused’s conduct as a series of 
linked actions and concluded that the accused knew all three acts would 
lead to “one continuing uninterrupted course of conduct centring upon 
and enterprise to blow up a building or infrastructure.”231
The Lodhi court’s reading of the fault element (awareness of cir-
cumstance) attracted criticism for stretching the boundaries of criminal 
liability beyond the principles of criminal law.232  It would undoubtedly 
also provoke criticism if it had been used as a basis for confiscation.  In 
other words, if a person is convicted of a preparatory terrorism offense 
when there is no actual terrorist act or when the gravity, nature and the 
scale of a terrorist act is not clear even to the accused, what exactly should 
be confiscated?
In a case like Lodhi, the convict’s involvement in any terrorist act 
need not to be proven, yet any of his property could be in danger of 
confiscation if the prosecution can link it to any (unproven) terrorist 
act assumed by the prosecution to be the target of the convict.  Even 
if the law contains a defense (as the English law does)233 which allows 
the accused to prove, by providing evidence, that the seized or confis-
cated property was not intended or could be used for terrorism, it is still 
problematic with regard to what terrorist act the accused should pro-
vide such evidence for in order to prevent the confiscation.  That is, the 
imposed liability under this mental element is too vague to allow for any 
sort of meaningful rebuttal.  A confiscation order can be issued in cases 
where the accused may deny (as Lodhi did, although unsuccessfully)234 
229. Regina v. Lodhi, (2006), 199 NSWLR 364 (Austl.).
230. Id. ¶ 44.
231. Id.
232. See Bernadette McSherry et al., Regulating Deviance: The Redirection 
of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law 141–64 (Bernadette McSher-
ry et al. eds., 2008).
233. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
supra note 65, art. 18(2).  It is a defense for a person charged with an offense under 
subsection (1) to prove that he did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect 
that the arrangement related to terrorist property.
234. See Regina v. Lodhi, supra note 229, ¶¶ 15, 19, 22. Lodhi, although he denied 
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his involvement in preparation for a terrorist act, where the prosecution 
is exempted from proving that terrorist act at all, and where such an act 
is not planned or even clear to the accused.
This mens rea seems too ambiguous in its scope to meet the accessi-
bility and foreseeability requirements of the right to property provisions 
and to provide sufficient safeguards against the unjust confiscations or 
capricious interferences with peaceful possession.  However, its use has 
been justified on the basis that it is an efficient tool for ensuring securi-
ty and prevention of (fictional) subsequent harm.235  But at what price?
2. Confiscation Based on General Knowledge of a Terrorist Act
Where the actual knowledge or intention of a financer need not be 
linked to a specific terrorist act,236 ‘general knowledge of a terrorist act’ 
has been regarded by a Canadian court as a sufficient fault element to 
trigger criminal liability for the facilitation of or contribution to terror-
ist activity.237  The court ruled in R. v. Khawaja that “it is unnecessary that 
an accused be shown to have knowledge of the specific nature of terror-
ist activity he intends to aid, support, enhance or facilitate, as long as he 
knows it is terrorist activity in a general way.”238  According to its ruling, 
the accused need not know the specific details of the subsequent terror-
ist act as long as he or she knows that an act of terrorism is coming.239 
This fault element as a basis for imposing criminal liability is justified as 
an efficient tool to include cases where a terrorist cell may not know the 
specific nature of the terrorist act which the actual perpetrator is going to 
carry out until the last moment.240  This reading of the fault requirement is 
the charges, received 30 years imprisonment.
235. Andrew Lynch & George Williams, What Price Security?: Taking Stock 
of Australia’s Anti-Terror Law 19 (2006).  The Australian Minister for Justice and 
customs justified the structure of terrorism offences as it is as follows as
In the security environment that we are dealing with, you may well have 
a situation where a number of people are doing things but you do not 
yet have the information which would lead you to identify a particular 
act . . . When you are dealing with security, you have to keep an eye on 
prevention of the act itself as well as bringing those who are guilty of the 
act to justice . . . [T]he original intention of the legislation [is] to remove 
any doubt that a person can be prosecuted for a terrorist act and acts 
preparatory to a terrorist act, and that our agencies can investigate such 
acts even if a specific target has not been identified.
Id.
236. Canada Criminel Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 83.02 (Can.).
237. See Regina v. Khawaja, 2006 CanLII 63685 (ON SC).
238. Id. ¶ 39.
239. Id. ¶ 32.
240. Id. ¶ 31.  The court referred to a transcript of a videotape of Bin Laden who 
said:
The Brothers, who conducted the operation, all they knew was that they 
have a martyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go to Amer-
ica but they didn’t know anything about the operation, not even one let-
ter.  But they were trained and we did not reveal the operation to them 
until they are there and just before they boarded the planes . . . those who 
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similar to the reading upheld by some EU Member States.  For example 
in Sweden, “there is a need to show that funds were provided with intent 
that a particular serious crime sooner or later will be carried out.”241
While it seems this formulation of the fault requirement satisfies 
minimum standards of knowledge since it requires some type of mate-
rial or actual connection between the act of preparation or facilitation 
and the subsequent crime, there are three sources of uncertainty as to the 
breadth of such a fault requirement.  First, although this fault require-
ment is broad enough to secure the conviction of those who facilitate 
the commission of a terrorist act without knowing the specific details of 
that terrorist act until the last moment, it imputes guilt to those who are 
remotely and indirectly linked to a terrorist act and who do not have any 
intention to finance or facilitate any terrorist act or do not know how 
their conduct will serve terrorism.  Under the construction of this require-
ment, the property of whoever engages closely or remotely, directly or 
indirectly, in the preparatory act can be confiscated in the same manner. 
For example, a restaurant owner who knows that certain customers are 
using his restaurant to plan a terrorist act can be held criminally liable for 
financing a terrorist act the same as those who are directly involved in the 
facilitation of that terrorist act.242  The court may decide not to accept the 
accused’s protest that he did not have any particular intention to finance 
the terrorist act and that his main purpose was to gain money from his 
business.  The court may find that whatever his purpose was, he knowing-
ly made his restaurant available to be used for planning a terrorist act.243 
Consequently, similar to the property of those directly involved in plan-
ning for the terrorist act (if any property involved at all), the restaurant 
is also forfeitable.
In addition, it appears that this mental requirement suggests a 
mens rea element closer to recklessness or negligence than a knowledge 
requirement.  That is, if an accused does need to have knowledge of the 
specific nature of an upcoming terrorist act, he cannot be absolutely or 
at least virtually certain that his funds or donation will be used for the 
commission of the terrorist act.  This “runs the risk of blurring the distinc-
tion between punishing a person as a terrorist for their subjective fault 
or for their negligence in not taking reasonable steps to avoid assisting 
terrorists.”244  Notably, any understanding that negligent engagement in 
were trained to fly didn’t know the others.  One group of people did not 
know the other group.
Id.
241. Financial Action Task Force, The Third Mutual Evaluation/Detailed Assess-
ment Report; Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism; Swe-
den, FATF ¶ 134 (Feb. 17, 2006).
242. Kevin E. Davis, Cutting Off the Flow of Funds to Terrorists: Whose Funds? 
Which Funds? Who Decides?, in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s An-
ti-Terrorism Bill 305 (Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 2001).
243. Id.
244. Kent Roach, Terrorism Offences and the Charter: A Comment on R. v. 
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the facilitation or financing of a terrorist act would suffice for the offense 
is inconsistent with the Terrorist Financing Convention and with EU law 
which excludes references to negligence and recklessness.245
The breadth of the mental element is also worrying as it may impose 
liability on innocent conduct not carried out for the commission of any 
terrorist act unless otherwise proven.  For example, suppose A and B 
decide to commit a terrorist act about which C knows, but disagrees.  If 
C engages in fund-raising with A and B for non-criminal purposes, but 
a portion of the funds collected ends up being used by A and B for the 
preparation or facilitation of the terrorist act without C’s knowledge, C 
seems to be criminally liable because all elements of the offense exist: C 
knowingly engaged in collecting funds that were used or were intend-
ed by A and B to be used for the preparation of the terrorist act, and C 
had a general knowledge that a terrorist act may occur through A and 
B.  This can consequently result in unfair and unsound confiscation of 
C’s property involved in the fund-raising.  His other property and assets 
assumed that they could be used for terrorist activity is also forfeitable if 
C fails to prove—in the sense of providing some evidence to disturb the 
inference of his knowledge—that his property or assets were not intend-
ed to be used or could be used for the preparation or commission of the 
terrorism act.
3. Identity-Based Confiscation
Cutting off the financial resources of terrorists and terrorist orga-
nizations is another method of addressing terrorist financing which has 
become widely used lately.  According to this method, hereinafter referred 
to as ‘identity-based confiscation,’ the knowledge that the recipient of the 
funds collected or provided is a terrorist or terrorist organization triggers 
criminal liability and makes the funds and property involved forfeitable. 
The identity-based approach is adopted by the UN Security Council 
resolutions246 and recommended by the FATF.247  Accordingly, UN Mem-
ber States and FATF members are required to criminalize and punish 
the financing of a terrorist act, individual terrorists, and terrorist orga-
nizations.  As mentioned above, this approach is clearly reflected in the 
legislation of some EU Member States such as Germany and Denmark.
Khawaja, 11 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 271, 286 (2007).
245. Council Directive 2015/849, supra note 162.
246. See, e.g., paragraph 1(d) of Resolution 1373 (S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc S/
Res/1325 (Sept. 28, 2001)) which requires all Member States to “[p]rohibit their na-
tionals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, 
financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, 
directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit 
or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on 
behalf of or at the direction of such persons.”
247. Financial Action Task Force, supra note 88, at 82.
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This formulation obviously does not require any additional require-
ment that there should be knowledge (or a specific intent) on the side 
of the financier that, for example, the funds are substantial enough in its 
value or its effect to enhance the ability of the group to commit a ter-
rorist act.  Imposition of such an additional requirement is considered 
to be too great a burden for the prosecution since it must prove that the 
financer knew that the contribution would further the criminal aims of 
the group.248  It is also reasoned that contribution to a group or a person 
may contain “dual use” and fungible resources, “which could be used for 
different purposes including illicit ones.249  However, multiple legal and 
human rights challenges result from such a fault element.
Firstly, if the knowledge of the identity of the recipient alone suffic-
es for the intent, the offense of financing terrorist groups seems to impose 
punishment on an act based only on the connection of that act with oth-
ers’ state of being, not with their criminal conduct.  In other words, the 
physical element of collecting or providing funds is innocuous enough; it 
is (the knowledge of) the status of the person or the group with whom 
people associate that criminalizes these acts.  Consequently, the intent of 
financers is irrelevant.  This is in clear contrast with rule of law standards 
such as the principle of legality which seeks to punish criminal conduct 
or participation in a criminal act, “not criminal types,”250 and the princi-
ple of mens rea which emphasizes that people “should be held criminally 
liable only for events or consequences which they intended or knowing-
ly risked.”251
Practically, this knowledge requirement—convicting a person for 
the provision of funds to a group on the ground that he or she knows 
the group is a designated terrorist group or that it is involved in crimi-
nal activities—causes some concerns in terms of sweeping up both guilty 
and non-guilty mental states.  For instance, a taxi driver could be liable 
for giving a ride to a member of a terrorist group if the driver knows 
that he or she is a member of the group.  Similarly, a hotel owner could 
be held liable for providing lodging to a member of a terrorist group. 
As a result of the imposition of liability under this knowledge require-
ment, the car and the hotel is forfeitable without the existence of any 
malicious intent or knowledge that the provision of the services could 
contribute to the preparation or contribution of a terrorist act and where 
the provision of these services may not be sufficiently substantial in the 
preparation or contribution of any criminal act.252  A US court has held 
that this knowledge requirement does not satisfy the requirement of per-
sonal guilt because knowledge of the identity of the recipient or of the 
248. David Henrik Pendle, Charity of the Heart and Sword: The Material Support 
Offense and Personal Guilt, 30 Seattle U. L. Rev. 777, 805 (2007).
249. Id. at 804.
250. McSherry et al., supra note 232, at 157.
251. Ashworth, supra note 215, at 74.
252. United States v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla 2004).
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unlawful activities of a group is not strong enough to impute guilt to the 
donor’s conduct; that is, “when criminality and punishment are justified 
by a relationship to others’ conduct, that relationship must be sufficiently 
substantial to constitutionally support criminal liability.”253
Concern also arises that this knowledge requirement imposes lia-
bility on well-intentioned financers who know the recipient is a terrorist 
group, but intend to further the lawful purposes of the group, or to pro-
vide humanitarian aid to the disaster and war zones controlled by a 
terrorist group. 254 If a financer is guilty even when he does not intend his 
or her funds to be used for terrorist activities or for the terrorist functions 
of a group, then no humanitarian support can be sent to any designated 
terrorist group.255  This seems to conflict with the words of the Terrorist 
Financing Convention, which requires Member States to criminalize only 
financing cases that are carried out “unlawfully.”256  The qualifier “unlaw-
fully” was included to the definition of the offense to add “an element 
of flexibility by, for example, excluding from the ambit of application of 
the draft convention legitimate activities, such as those of humanitarian 
organizations and ransom payments.”257  While the EU has excluded this 
qualifier from its definition of terrorist financing, a few individual EU 
Member States such as Switzerland have included such a qualifier to the 
definition of terrorist financing offense in order to exempt financing of 
certain kinds from the definition of the offense.258
Finally, not only does this intent requirement have a chilling effect, 
violating the right to freedom of expression for those who seek to pro-
vide material resources to “the non-violent humanitarian and political 
activities” of designated groups,259 but it may also result in the imposition 
of confiscation without the existence of a guilty mind on the financer’s 
part.  Such a sanction violates the right to property as it does not meet 
the proportionality test.  That test requires that the measure limit the fun-
damental right to property in accordance with the general interest only 
if it proportionally and reasonably enhances the aim of the measure.  In 
253. Id.
254. Sandi Halimuddin, U.S. Counterterrorism Laws Block International Hu-
manitarian Aid, World Policy Blog (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.worldpolicy.org/
blog/2013/12/19/us-counterterrorism-laws-block-international-humanitarian-aid 
[https://perma.cc/3L6F-7U87].
255. Pendle, supra note 248, at 785.
256. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
supra note 65, art. 2(1).
257. General Assembly, Working Group of the Sixth Committee, Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Working Group, Doc. A/C.6/54/L.2 at 
67.
258. Id. at 260 quinquies (3).  Financing of a group does not constitute an offense 
and as a result the money involved is not subject to forfeiture if the financing is not 
made to support the group “in its criminal activities,” or if the financing is carried out 
“with a view to establishing or re-establishing a democratic regime or a state governed 
by the rule of law or with a view to exercising or safeguarding human rights.”
259. Humanitarian Law Project v. United States DOJ, 352 F.3d 382, 385 (2003).
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this case, it is solely the prevention of funds and property from use in the 
commission or preparation of terrorist activity, and not the prevention of 
use for humanitarian purposes.
D. The EU Response to the Security Council Resolutions: Suspension 
of Criminal Law
1. Adoption of the UN Resolutions
The identity-based asset freezing approach—the freezing of assets 
of a person or a group on the basis of a suspicion (not conviction or 
charges) that they engage in terrorist activities or associate with ter-
rorists—has become the common practice of many jurisdictions due to 
the binding nature of the UN Security Council’s resolutions.  It is not 
clear whether the Security Council found it necessary to create a freez-
ing regime that imposes freezing sanctions for an indefinite time on such 
a flimsy basis because the confiscation measures established under the 
counter-terrorism laws have proved insufficient or impractical.  Regard-
less,260 it seems that the Security Council has shifted the focus of the fight 
against terrorist financing from a preventive approach, which seeks to 
counter terrorism within the sphere of criminal law by criminalizing 
all preparatory acts.  This may result in facilitation and contribution to 
terrorism, and an outdated, identity-based approach which seeks to inca-
pacitate persons or groups suspected of involvement in terrorism by 
freezing all of their assets without needing to find them guilty.  The dif-
fusion of this politically motivated method of dealing with the criminal 
issue of terrorist funds has been pushed through at national and regional 
levels at the cost of the complete suspension of criminal law.
The EU has adopted a mix of legal instruments to oblige its Mem-
ber States to implement the Security Council’s (identity-based) freezing 
measures.261  The EU responded to Security Council Resolutions 1267 
(1999) and 1333 (2000), which require States to freeze the assets of Bin 
Laden and Al-Qaida and other designated and listed individuals and 
entities associated with them, by incorporating the Security Council list 
into its own framework through the Regulation 881/2002.262  The incor-
260. The English Judge, Lord Rodger, commented that the measures adopted 
by these Security Council resolutions can be found in the Terrorist Financing Con-
vention.  But the reason that the Security Council adopted such resolutions is that by 
September 2001, only few states had adopted and ratified the Convention.  Indeed, 
the resolutions “imposed on all states the selected obligations which would otherwise 
have bound them only if they had eventually decided to ratify the Convention.”  See 
R (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2008], AC 332, ¶ 161.
261. Freezing of funds according to Article 1(2) the Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2580/2001 means “the prevention of any move, transfer, alteration, use of or dealing 
with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, loca-
tion, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable 
the funds to be used, including portfolio management.”
262. Regulation 881/2002 was amended several times by the Council Regulation 
(EU) No. 1286/2009 of December 22, 2009, and by the Council Regulation (EU) No. 
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poration of a person or entity into the implemented UN list does not 
need to be accompanied by the imposition of any charges or conviction. 
In fact, while the EU Commission seems to have power to make inde-
pendent decisions on listing and delisting,263 the EU Commission has 
faithfully adopted and updated its list in accordance with the UN list. 
Article 2 of Regulation 881/2002 requires the freezing of “all funds and 
economic resources belonging to, or owned or held by”, the listed persons 
and entities.264 “No funds” and “no economic resources” should be made 
available, directly or indirectly, to these people and entities.265  These pro-
visions are directly applicable in European national systems without the 
need to transpose them into domestic legislation.266
In responding to Resolution 1373 (2001), which requires states to 
adopt independent measures against those whom states consider to be 
terrorists, the EU has taken an approach similar to its implementation of 
the Al-Qaida Sanction list.  It has adopted Common Position 2001/931, 
leading to the establishment of an autonomous EU list which incorpo-
rates groups and persons suspected of being “involved in terrorist acts.”267 
‘Involvement in terrorist acts’ has a broad meaning and includes mere 
association with terrorists.  According to Article 2 (1) of the Common 
Position, ‘persons and entities involved in terrorist acts’ means
persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or who 
participate in, or facilitate, the commission of terrorist act[;] groups 
and entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such per-
sons; and persons, groups and entities acting on behalf of, or under 
the direction of, such persons, groups and entities, including funds 
derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by such persons and associated persons, groups and entities.
The list of person and entities involved in terrorist acts should be drawn 
up and reviewed
on the basis of precise information or material in the relevant 
file which indicates that a decision has been taken by a [national] 
competent authority, [denoting a judicial authority or an equiv-
alent competent authority]268, .  .  . irrespective of whether [the list] 
754/2011 of August 1, 2011, and by Commission Implementation Regulation (EU) 
2016/13 of January 6, 2016.
263. The latest amendment to the listing procedure of the UN designation list 
requires the EU Commission to take a decision to list a person or entity designated 
by the UN Sanction Committee on the basis of a statement of reasons provided by 
the UN Sanction Committee.  The Commission, then, communicates the decision to 
the listed person or entity and provide them a chance to “express his, her or its views 
on the matter.”  If any observations are submitted, the Commission may review its 
decision.  Those observations shall be forwarded to the UN Sanction committee.  See 
Council Regulation (EU) 1286/2009, art. 7(a), 2009 (L 346/42).
264. Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002, art. 2(1), 2002 (L 139/9).
265. Id. art. 2, (2)–(3).
266. Id.
267. Council Common Position, On the Application of Specific Measures to 
Combat Terrorism, 2001/931/CFSP, art. 1 (L 344/93).
268. A “competent authority” here does not mean an appeal or review body.  It is 
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concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terror-
ist act, an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an 
act[,] based on serious and credible evidence or clues, or condemna-
tion for such deeds.269
While it seems that such a procedure would involve some form of “judi-
cial check,” “there is no certainty of this.”270  What is certain is that there 
is a need for a decision to be made by a national authority.  In practice, a 
person or entity can be listed merely on the basis of information or clues 
obtained from “the sphere of intelligence or investigation.”271  In addi-
tion, the basis on which an investigation is instigated or suspicion is raised 
seems to vary from one state to another due to differences in the national 
perceptions of terrorist threats, and differences with regard to the defini-
tion of a ‘terrorist act’ or ‘terrorist group.’272  Consequently the Common 
Position requires “the freezing of the funds and other financial assets or 
economic resources of the persons, groups and entities listed.”273  Under 
the Regulation 2580/2001, the EU Council, “acting by unanimity,” has 
also designated a list of individuals and groups suspected of committing 
or attempting to commit, participating in, or facilitating the commission 
of any act of terrorism; legal persons or entities owned or controlled by 
such designated persons, groups or entities; or persons or entities acting 
on behalf of or at the direction of such person and entities.274  Article 2 of 
the Regulation allows the freezing of all funds, other financial assets and 
economic resources owned or held by listed person or entities.
an investigative body authorized by a state to investigate on suspected individuals or 
groups.  “An investigation may well be authorized by a court or an investigative judge, 
but depending on how a state’s system is constructed.  It can also be envisaged that 
investigations are ordered by a prosecutor.  It is even possible that the investigation 
is an intelligence operation ordered by a senior security official which is not designed 
to result in the collection of evidence or prosecution.”  See Iain Cameron, European 
Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting, 3 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 225, 235 (2003).
269. Council Common Position of December 27, 2001, supra note 267, art. 1(4). 
A “clearing house” and “Working Party on implementation of Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism,” com-
posed of the representatives of the ministries of justice and internal affairs of the 
EU Member States, has been established and charged with evaluating the informa-
tion provided by states (national competent authority) to decide whether a suspected 
person or organization is involved in terrorism.  After the examination, the Council 
adopts the list through a unanimous Council decision.
270. Imelda Tappeiner, The Fight Against Terrorism. The Lists and the Gaps, 1 
Utrecht L. Rev. 97, 106 (2005).
271. Id.
272. The EU, in the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (Articles 1 
and 2), has defined ‘terrorist act’ and ‘terrorist group.’ But, the EU Member States 
have not transposed the definition into their national law.  As illustrated above, this 
has resulted in a disparity in their definition of terrorism, and probably the standard 
against which terrorist suspects’ actions are judged.  Framework Decision on Combat-
ing Terrorism 2002/475/JHA, arts. 1–2, 2002 (L 164/3).
273. Id. art. 2.
274. Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001, art. 2(3), 2001 (L 344/70) established a 
list of persons and entities with regard to Article 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001.
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2. Human Rights Challenges and Introduction of Amendments: 
Is It Enough?
Although reaching an agreement to establish a regional asset-freez-
ing system may be regarded as a notable achievement in the fight against 
terrorism, in practice, the implementation of the measures, with regard to 
both the implemented UN list and the autonomous EU lists, poses seri-
ous questions of human rights compatibility.  In spite of the operation 
of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union which established the principles of due process within the EU, the 
asset-freezing regimes (that is, the autonomous EU list and the imple-
mented UN list) did not provide the right for listed persons or groups 
to be heard, a right to access effective judicial review or a right to enjoy 
the possession or use of their property.  As soon as a person or group 
was placed into one of the designated lists, states could freeze all of the 
assets of the listed person for an indefinite time, without imposing any 
charges or conviction of involvement in terrorist activity, association with 
terrorists, or the use or intended use of his assets for criminal activity. 
The EU’s General Court, in early cases, did not find these asset freezing 
sanctions “an arbitrary, inappropriate or disproportionate interference 
with the fundamental rights of the persons concerned.”275  They repeat-
edly held that “freezing of funds is a temporary precautionary measure 
which, unlike confiscation, does not affect the very substance of the right 
of the persons concerned to property in their financial assets but only 
the use thereof.”276  In addition, they refused to review the legality of the 
sanctions imposed against persons and entities listed in the implemented 
UN list because they found themselves incompetent to review or chal-
lenge the UN Security Council resolutions.277  However, the severity of 
the sanctions—the freezing of all the assets of listed persons for an indef-
inite period—led the courts to acknowledge (and scholars to argue) that 
these sanctions are quasi-criminal in nature, and need to be regarded as 
“either judicial or subject to judicial review.”278
275. Case T–315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Comm’n, 2005, 
E.C.R. II-3659 ¶ 251.
276. Id. See also Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. 
Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3542; Case T-47/03, Sison v. Council, 2007, E.C.R. 
II-2049; Case T-49/07, Fahas v. Council, 2010, E.C.R. II-5581.
277. See Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, supra note 275, ¶ 215.  With regard to the 
question of whether EU courts are competent to review the listing and freezing mea-
sures adopted against persons and groups listed in the EU autonomous list, the Court 
of First Instance had found itself competent to assess the lawfulness of the measures 
as they were adopted in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 
which calls for the adoption of necessary measures to combat terrorist financing with-
out specifying persons or entities who should be subject to the measures.  See e.g., Case 
T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council, 2006, E.C.R. 
II-4706.
278. Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010, E.C.R. II-5234 (referring to the opin-
ion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights).  For scholars’ 
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Eventually, the European Court of Justice, in its decision on Kadi, 
the leading case,279 noted that the EU “is based on the rule of law.”280  It 
held that “respect for human rights is a condition of the lawfulness . .  . 
[of EU laws] . . . and that measures incompatible with respect for human 
rights are not acceptable in the Community.”281  It continued that
the obligations imposed by an international agreement [UN res-
olutions] cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional 
principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all 
Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect con-
stituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to 
review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies 
established by the Treaty.282
Although it ruled that EU courts are competent to review the lawfulness 
of asset freezing measures, no court has upheld a challenge or examined 
the nature of the assets freezing regime against the accepted principles 
of criminal law which are applied in criminalization and confiscation 
proceedings.  In this regard, the European Court of Justice, in Kadi, rec-
ognized that in fulfilling their international obligations, legislatures at the 
domestic or EU level enjoy “a wide margin of appreciation, with regard 
both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether 
the consequences of enforcement are justified in the public interest for 
the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question.”283
Nonetheless, the European Court of Justice, in Kadi, found the 
procedure deployed to list and freeze the assets of the targeted persons 
concerned in this case to be in violation of due process rights because it 
lacked a mechanism whereby the targeted persons could be informed of 
the reasons or the basis of which they had been listed and their assets 
had been frozen.284  The court also held that the deployed procedure was 
in breach of the right to effective judicial protection as “it was adopted 
without furnishing any guarantee enabling the listed persons concerned 
to put his case to competent authorities.”285
The court, therefore, set an administrative guideline which has been 
incorporated into the EU laws.286  This guideline consists of two parts: list-
ed persons must be informed of the reasons adduced against them; and 
views, see also Christina Eckes, EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamen-
tal Rights: The Case of Individual Sanctions (2009); Cameron, supra note 268; or 
Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism 
Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 Berkley J. Int’l L. 203 (2007).
279. See Murphy, supra note 79, at 132.
280. Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat 
Int’l Found. v. Council, 2008, E.C.R. I-6490.
281. Id. ¶ 284.
282. Id. ¶ 285.
283. Id. ¶ 360.
284. Id.
285. Id. ¶ 369.
286. See Council Regulation (EU) No. 1286/2009 of Dec. 22, 2009 Amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002, 2009 O. J. (L 346) 42.
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listed persons must be able to express their view to the EU Commission 
on those reasons.287  However, the court (as well as the new amendment 
to the EU laws) emphasized that there is no need to communicate those 
reasons to listed persons, or to hear the listed persons’ views on the rea-
sons, before they are entered in the list and before the freezing sanctions 
are imposed against them.288
Unlike the UN listing and freezing procedures which do not pro-
vide for a mechanism for judicial or impartial review of the sanctions,289 
to retain the right to judicial review, EU courts have found themselves 
competent to “review of the conformity of the system of sanctions .  .  . 
with the system of judicial protection of fundamental rights laid down 
by the EC Treaty.”290  But in another case, the General Court held that 
this does not mean that courts can “substitute their assessment of the 
facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures for that 
of the Council.”291  In fact, it has made plain that a review for confor-
mity, which seems to be an administrative review, should be limited to 
“checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of rea-
sons have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and 
that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or mis-
use of power.”292
287. Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al 
Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, 2008, E.C.R. I-6504.  With regard to listing and freez-
ing procedure used to establish and update the EU autonomous list, the Court of 
First Instance in the Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran 
v. Council, 2006, E.C.R. II-04665, ruled that “a statement of reasons” on the basis 
of which a person or entity is listed must be communicated to the listed persons or 
entities.
288. See Council Regulation No. 1286/2009 of Dec. 22, 2009, art. 7a(2), 2009 O.J. 
(L 346) 42.
289. In 2009, the Security Council authorized the establishment of an Office of 
the Ombudsperson to assist the Security Council in delisting requests.  The Ombud-
sperson can intervene on behalf of the listed persons but her/his decision does not 
override the Security Council’s decisions on listing or de-listing.  The Ombudsperson 
provides judicial review of listing decisions.
290. Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010, E.C.R. II-5222, supra note 279, ¶ 117.
291. Case T-228/02, Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council, supra note 287, 
¶ 159.  In terms of reviewing measures adopted against persons listed by the UN Se-
curity Council, the European Court of Justice, in Kadi v. Commission, ruled that “in 
the event that the [listed] person concerned challenges the lawfulness of the decision 
to list or maintain the listing of his name, . . . the review by the Courts of the Europe-
an Union must extend to whether rules as to procedure and rules as to competence, 
including whether or not the legal basis is adequate, are observed.”  This means that 
courts need to determine whether the decision to list a person “is taken on a suffi-
ciently solid factual basis,” and whether the reason for adoption of that decision in 
itself is “substantiated.”  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Kadi v. 
Comm’ n, 2013, published electronically, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/docu-
ment.jsf?text=&docid=135223&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=-
first&part=1&cid=5243 [https://perma.cc/55YK-L3K2].
292. Id.
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3. Is It Legally Justifiable?
While the attempts of the EU courts to change the procedural rules 
for listing and imposing freezing sanctions should not be understated, 
it is naive to believe that such changes would remove all barriers to the 
establishment of a well-funded, human rights-consistent regime.  In this 
section, I will argue that the existing regime is a gross violation of due 
process and human rights values.
a. Ambiguity in the Nature of the Regime and Challenge of 
Presumption of Innocence
Firstly, the regime offends a key principle of criminal law, the pre-
sumption of innocence.  Targeted persons or entities are suspected of (not 
charged with or convicted of) being involved in terrorism on the basis of 
information and evidence obtained from the instigation of investigations 
or intelligence.  These persons or entities must be listed (in other words, 
labelled and announced) as terrorists, and all their assets are to be fro-
zen.  Although the evidence adduced to enable the listing of persons is 
not tested in any independent, impartial judicial court, any listed persons 
or entities seeking delisting must submit evidence to the body (the Secu-
rity Council, national authorities or the EU council) which listed them to 
prove that they are not terrorists or terrorist supporters.
The European Convention on Human Rights and the EU’s Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights state that “everyone charged with a criminal 
offense should be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law.”293  Since the establishment of the regime, there has been a continu-
ing debate as to whether the sanctioning measures imply an accusation 
of a criminal kind under human rights laws.  The measures have been 
designed in such a way so as not to be indicative of criminal sanctions; 
that is, they are not classified as a criminal offense or criminal charge in 
any jurisdiction; instead they are designed as precautionary, temporary 
measures which pursue preventive purposes and do not impose any pun-
ishment in the criminal sense of the word.294  However, in practice, they 
have the effect of a criminal sanction: they impose the stigma of being 
a worst type of criminal (a terrorist) on targeted persons; they deprive 
the targeted persons of access to all of his assets and property for indef-
inite time (in some cases longer than the punishment provided for the 
commission of terrorist offenses);295 they have a profound impact on the 
293. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 222, art. 6(2).  Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 220, art. 48.
294. To determine whether a measure has a criminal nature, the European Court 
of Human Right looks into the domestic classification of the measure, the nature of the 
offense, and severity of punishment that may be imposed.  See Engel & Others v. The 
Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57479 [https://
perma.cc/4AGZ-57N5].  It seems the freezing sanction cannot meet any of these cri-
teria.  See Melissa van den Broek, Monique Hazelhorst and Wouter de Zanger, Asset 
Freezing: Smart Sanction or Criminal Charge?, 27 Utrecht J. Int’l & Eur. L. 18 (2010).
295. Kadi was listed and his assets were frozen for 10 years.  See Kadi v. Comm’n 
(2013), supra note 291.
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social and financial lives of not only the target persons, but also those 
who have relationships with them.296
One may ask that, if this stigmatization and loss of livelihood is not 
a criminal matter and does not have a punitive nature, then what kind of 
character does it have? Is it possible to argue that a certain group of cit-
izens are excluded from the protection of human rights? Can the human 
rights laws be read to mean that everyone suspected of being a terrorist 
or a terrorist supporter should remain, and be announced as, a crimi-
nal suspect until authorities decide otherwise? Irrespective of how these 
questions are dealt with, the fact remains that the sanctioning regime 
“strips the individual of protections that are key to the safeguarding of 
the rule of law.”297
b. Principle of Legality
Under the principle of legality, a person’s rights can be restrict-
ed only under clear statutory language.  But the asset-freezing regime 
violates this principle.  The main challenge that the regime (or any count-
er-terrorism regime which aims at setting up universal measures against 
terrorism) faces is, in the absence of a universal agreement on the nature, 
definition and scope of the offense of terrorism, what evidence may be 
used to raise a suspicion that a person or an entity is a terrorist or a 
terrorist supporter? On the basis of what definition should a person’s 
actions be judged? And what should the listed persons do, or how should 
he or she behave, to dispel the suspicion that he or she is not a terrorist 
or a terrorist supporter?
While these questions have been left unanswered, the UN Securi-
ty Council has ruled that a person or entity can be targeted as a terrorist 
suspect if they are suspected of
participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or per-
petrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name 
of, on behalf of, or in support of; supplying, selling or transferring 
arms and related materiel to; recruiting for; or otherwise supporting 
acts or activities of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or 
any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof.298
296. In Chafiq Ayadi v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-2180, the sanctioning measures 
had “the effect of denying an individual all income or public assistance and, ultimate-
ly, any means of subsistence for him and his family.”  He was refused by the Irish 
authorities a taxi-driver’s license as it would have been regarded as provision of fi-
nancial services to him.  In Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council 
and Comm’n, supra note 276, Yusef, a Swedish citizen, was listed by the UN Sanction 
Committee, and all of his assets were frozen by the Swedish government.  The family 
was rendered destitute.  His social assistance was frozen.  No one was allowed to help 
them, and he was removed by Kista employment office from the list of job seekers. 
The Swedish authorities raised doubt that the payments made to the applicants by the 
Swedish authorities might be unlawful.  It took a while for the authorities to find a way 
to give them some social benefits to survive.
297. Murphy, supra note 79, at 144.
298. S.C Res. 1882, U.N. Doc S/RES/1882 (June 30, 2008).  See also S.C. Res. 1617, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
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No definition of ‘terrorist act’ and ‘terrorist group’ is provided.  There is 
no need to link a person’s action to an actual terrorist act.  It is also not 
clear what level of association with a terrorist group may give rise to the 
suspicion that the targeted person is criminal-minded.  Association with 
such a terrorist group for humanitarian purposes may not prevent a per-
son or entity from being blacklisted.  So, in this situation, it is not clear 
on what basis a state may regard a person or entity as a terrorist and pro-
pose their listing in the UN designated list, and it is also unclear on what 
basis the UN’s Sanctions Committee may list, or refuse to list, that per-
son.  For example, in Yusef, three Swedish citizens were placed on the UN 
Sanction list on the basis of the information that the US provided and 
all of their assets were frozen.299  There was argument between the US 
and Sweden as to whether the listed persons did meet the requirements 
of being regarded as terrorist supporters.300  While the US authorities 
and the Sanction Committee thought there was sufficient evidence to 
suspect them of being a terrorist, Sweden’s intelligence agency was not 
convinced.301  Two of the targeted persons were eventually delisted after 
a long diplomatic struggle between the US and Sweden.
A similar approach has been taken in establishing and updating 
the autonomous EU list.  A person may be listed not only for being sus-
pected of committing, or attempting terrorist acts, but also for having 
a connection with or being in association with a terrorist or a terrorist 
group.  While the EU has provided definitions of ‘terrorist act’ and ‘ter-
rorist group,’ the definitions have not been transposed by the Member 
States into domestic law, likely due to differences in national percep-
tions of terrorist threat.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a 
person or entity is placed (by the request of a Member State and a unan-
imous decision of the Council) on the autonomous EU list in accordance 
with national authorities’ perception of a terrorist threat, rather than 
with regard to the definition of terrorism provided.302  A good example 
is the insistence on keeping the Kurdish militant group, the PKK, in the 
autonomous EU list.303  The group renounced its military struggle against 
Turkey in 2013 and has been lawfully operating for a few years.304  Its 
armed wing in Syria is receiving recognition and help from the US and 
299. Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, su-
pra note 276.
300. Serge Schmemann, A Nation Challenged: Sanctions and Fallout; Swedes Take 
Up the Cause of 3 on US Terror List, N.Y. Times (Jan. 26, 2006) http://www.nytimes.
com/2002/01/26/world/nation-challenged-sanctions-fallout-swedes-take-up-cause-3-
us-terror-list.html [https://perma.cc/QM9Q-RFVT].
301. Christina Eckes, EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental 
Rights: The Case of Individual Sanctions 33–34 (2009).
302. Murphy, supra note 79, at 140.
303. Deniz Serinci, European Decision to Keep PKK on Terrorism List ‘Unwise,’ 
Politicians Say, Rudaw Media Network (June, 12, 2015), http://rudaw.net/english/
middleeast/12062015 [https://perma.cc/VF9Y-WKLC].
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other Western help in its fight against the Islamic State (ISIS).  Neverthe-
less, it is still on the EU list.
The obvious conclusion, as Murphy says, is that
even if the sanctions system is viewed as an extraordinary preventive 
counter-measure, it still breaches key rule of law principles.  First, the 
absence of any clear rules on why any particular individuals or enti-
ties are targeted by either the UN or EU sanction list is a breach of 
the principle of legality.  The presence of multiple [and vague] defi-
nitions of terrorism, and the apparent application of non them is a 
clear breach of this cornerstone of the constitutive aspect of the rule 
of law.  Problems with the constitutive aspect of the rule of law have 
consequential effects for the rule of law’s safeguarding aspect.  If the 
relevant rules are vague and are not applied then the individual can-
not know what rules they are subject to.305
c. Due Process
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires 
that “in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him,” everyone is entitled to be treated fairly, effi-
ciently and effectively by, inter alia, being heard and having access to an 
independent and impartial tribunal.  The rights to due process also place 
limitations on laws and legal proceedings to safeguard these rights.  In 
the case of almost all anti-transnational crime measures, the rule of due 
process requires the freezing procedure to be limited by two conditions: 
the freezing of assets should be connected to a criminal investigation, and 
the investigation should be related to the commission, preparation, or 
proceeds of, of crime.306  This procedure is justifiable “prior to bringing of 
criminal proceedings against an individual, the state may wish to freeze 
their assets to prevent their dispersal or use for criminal activities.”307 
However, the terrorist asset-freezing regime is remarkably inconsistent 
with this procedure.  In other words, by being classified as a temporary, 
precautionary, and administrative system of sanctions, notwithstanding 
its criminal effects, the asset-freezing regime grossly violates all standards 
of due process rights, even civil due process standards.
Firstly, the person can be listed and subject to freezing sanctions on 
the basis of information (not necessarily a criminal investigation) which 
raises a suspicion that the person is involved in terrorism or in associ-
ation with terrorists (suspicion by association).  There is no need for a 
link between the person’ activity and any terrorist act.  There is either no 
mechanism to turn the freezing sanctions into confiscation or no time-
frame to lift the sanctions.
According to the new amendments to the EU laws, the listed per-
son should be informed of the reasons for which he is listed and his assets 
frozen.  He is entitled to communicate his views on these reasons to the 
305. Murphy, supra note 79, at 140.
306. Id. at 139.
307. Id.
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body (national authorities, the EU Council, the UN Sanction Commit-
tee) which blacklisted him.  Assuming that there was an agreed set of 
rules and standards on the definitions and determination of ‘terrorist 
involvement’ and ‘terrorist association,’ can this be regarded as the ‘right 
to be heard’?  While it is inaccurate to say that after hearing the persons’ 
view on the reasons, these bodies (national authorities, the EU Coun-
cil, the UN Sanction Committee) would not be able to reach a fair and 
impartial decision, it is unfair and in violation of due process not to allow 
the targeted person to be heard by an impartial and independent judicial 
body where the rules of evidence and procedure are applied.308
One may argue that by recognizing that national or EU courts are 
competent to review the legality of the listing and restrictive measures, 
the listed persons and entities are given the right to fair hearing and right 
to access to an effective remedy.  However, it should be noted that such a 
review is administrative and limited to checking whether the listing and 
the imposition of freezing measures have complied with the procedural 
safeguards set out, and whether such a decision “is taken on a sufficiently 
solid factual basis.”309  This means that the court merely reviews wheth-
er the reasons for listing and freezing are convincing enough to continue 
suspecting that the targeted person is a terrorist or terrorist associate or 
that they may use their assets for terrorist purposes.  This is far from a 
determination of whether the listed person has actually committed, or 
attempted to commit, terrorist activity.  It also does not require the court 
to determine whether or how much of the assets of the targeted persons 
were involved in, or intended to be used for, terrorist activity.
Finally, what is the point of seeking judicial review if such a review 
is ineffective? That is, if a national or EU court annuls the restrictive mea-
sures adopted by the UN Sanction Committee, the targeted person will 
remain on the UN terrorist list because such annulment is not binding 
on the Security Council (the Sanction Committee).  While the court may 
order the unfreezing of the assets, a state may issue an executive order 
overruling the court’s decision,310 which it must do to avoid breaching 
its international obligations.  In addition, judicial review does not seem 
to offer effective and permanent protection, as there is always a possi-
bility of being re-listed on the basis of a new investigation or allegation 
made against the person who has obtained through judicial review the 
annulment of listing and sanctions.  For example, in the Case of People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran, despite three successive annulments, the 
targeted entity was re-listed three times on the basis of new allegations 
308. Jeans-Francois Thony and Cheong-Ann Png, FATF Recommendations and 
UN Resolutions on the Financing of Terrorism; a Review of the Status of Implementa-
tion and Legal Challenges Faced by Countries, 14 J. Fin. Crime 150, 160 (2007).
309. Kadi v. Comm’n (2013), supra note 291, ¶ 119.
310. Sidney Yankson, Starving Terrorist of Their Financial Oxygen—At All 
Costs?, 13 J. Money Laundering Control 282, 290 (2010).
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provided by different states (France and the UK).311  It took over ten 
years for the entity at issue to be removed from the autonomous EU list.
d. Right to Property
The legality of the asset-freezing regime can also be challenged 
in relation to the right to property.  As far as human rights laws are 
concerned, the validity of any measure interfering with one’s proper-
ty depends on its compatibility with the law protecting human right to 
property.  As mentioned before, the individual right to property can be 
limited in accordance to the general interest of a society under restrict-
ed circumstances.  But in order to be lawful, such a measure must strike 
a balance between the pursuit of a general interest and the limitations 
that it imposes on the rights of an individual.  Where the lawfulness of a 
measure is examined, under the principle of proportionality, the answer 
to each of the following questions should be in the affirmative: Is the pur-
pose of the measure sufficiently important to justify its imposition? Is the 
measure adopted in pursuit of the “public interest” rationally connected 
to it? Are the measures used to impair individuals’ rights no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective?
In the context of the suppression of terrorist funds, there is no 
doubt that allocation or use of funds or property for the preparation or 
commission of terrorist acts is blameworthy and should be subject to 
limitation.  However, the asset-freezing regime, which is pre-emptive in 
nature and focuses, focusing on minimizing or eliminating the risk that 
terrorist suspects or supporters may use their assets for terrorist activity, 
hardly survives the second and third tests.  The question that needs to be 
tested is this: if the dangerous nature of a person poses such a risk, does 
the freezing of all of his assets “rationally” and appropriately eradicate 
the risk of his assets being used for terrorist acts? In defining what counts 
as “rationally,” EU courts, with regard to another system of restrictive 
measures of an economic nature, held that
measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the 
objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation . . . when there is 
a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be 
had to the least onerous, (whether the measure is the least intrusive 
in the circumstances and that struck a fair and appropriate balance 
between all affected interests), and the disadvantages caused must 
not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.312
The main controversy here is whether the freezing of all assets of a per-
son suspected of (not convicted of, or charged with) being involved in 
terrorism or connected with terrorists for an indefinite time is the only 
311. Case T-228/02, People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Council of the European 
Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-0466; Case T-248/08, People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Council 
of the European Union, 2008 Published Electronically; Case T-256/07, People’s Moja-
hedin Org. of Iran v. Council of the European Union, 2008 E.C.R. II-03019.
312. Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Fedesa & Others, 1990 E.C.R. I-04023.  See 
also, Haung v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2007), 2 AC, 167, 187, ¶ 19.
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and the “least onerous” and restrictive measure that could be deployed 
to eliminate the risk.  It is simply too difficult to believe that this measure 
is the only and the least intrusive means of protecting the public inter-
est.  Finding the alternative tools to deal with the problem is beyond the 
scope of this research.  However, the freezing regime as it currently exists 
seems to be a reversion to the primitive freezing and confiscation mea-
sures deployed by former fascist totalitarian regimes against groups of 
people suspected by the regime of posing risk to the economic and polit-
ical stability of the regime.313
Lastly, there is no guarantee that the regime could pass the third test 
(proportionality) at all times.  As mentioned before, the main purpose 
of the establishment of the right to property is to prevent the arbitrary 
and capricious interference with peaceful possession “that many govern-
ments—frequently have been—all too prone to resort to.”314  The right 
to property can be limited in the general interest of the society.  How-
ever, there is a serious concern as to whether there will be guarantees 
that the asset-freezing measures will not be used unlawfully and cruel-
ly against a specific (non-guilty) group of people.  In the absence of an 
agreed and clear definition of ‘terrorism,’ ‘terrorist involvement’ and ‘ter-
rorist association,’ giving so much power to the executive authorities (the 
UN Sanction Committee, states, intelligent agencies, etc.) to determine 
who are terrorists or terrorist supporters, without any proper supervision, 
is quite dangerous.  There is potential for some unscrupulous executive 
authority to turn the measures into weapons against those whom it wish-
es to suppress simply by labelling them as terrorists and freezing all of 
their assets.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have identified the issues arising from the imple-
mentation of the criminalization and confiscation provisions introduced 
by the Terrorist Financing Convention and diffused by Western-backed 
international organizations.  I have illustrated how these provisions 
stretch the boundaries of criminal law beyond its traditional principles 
and consequently violate the fundamental rights of individuals.  Regard-
less of these characteristics, all states, including ASEAN Member States, 
have been encouraged and pushed to incorporate these provisions into 
their law.  While ASEAN lacks a cohesive counter-terrorist financing 
regime, individual ASEAN Member States have developed, and are 
still developing, their counter-terrorist financing regime in accordance 
313. For example, the Nazi regime in Germany regarded the Jews as the follow-
ers of an abhorrent religious, economic and political doctrine, who seek to dominate 
the non-Jewish world.  The regime considered the Jews’ dominance harmful based on 
the assumption that their dominance on financial system caused the German defeat in 
World War One.  The regime used various tools including, inter alia, freezing and con-
fiscation sanctions on all Jews to eliminate their risk.  See Martin Dean, Robbing the 
Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933–1945 (2010).
314. Marckx v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 6833/74, ¶ 20 (1979).
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with the Terrorist Financing Convention and the FATF’s recommenda-
tions.  The laws and policies of four ASEAN Member States (Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) on criminalization of terrorist 
financing and confiscation of terrorist funds have been examined by this 
paper.  The regulatory problems that arise from the implementation of 
these laws and policies in these ASEAN Member States have been dis-
cussed.  Wondering whether EU, a value-based community with a strong 
commitment in preservation and promotion of democratic values and 
human rights, can provide a good model for the ASEAN, I have thorough-
ly examined EU’s and its Member States’ laws and policies on terrorist 
financing.  The following are the summary and results of this research.
The adoption and implementation of the existing counter-terrorism 
measures by both EU and ASEAN Member States seem to face similar 
problems.  First and foremost, it is not clear what exactly constitutes (or 
does not constitute) terrorism, a terrorist act or a terrorist group.  The 
Member States of both the EU and ASEAN have different understand-
ing and definitions of terrorism.  Their definitions are so vague and broad. 
As far as the principle of legality is concerned, this raises a concern that 
in determining terrorist financing offenses, there are multiple possible 
definitions of terrorism that can be used as grounds to impose liability or 
forfeiture sanctions.
In terms of the conceptualization of terrorist financing as an 
offense, both ASEAN and EU Member States have incorporated into 
their law the vague definition provided and promoted by the Terrorist 
Financing Convention, and FATF’s recommendations.  That is, financing 
of terrorism, which includes financing of terrorist acts, terrorists, and ter-
rorist organizations, is an independent offense without a requirement to 
link the act of financing to an actual criminal act for which the financing 
acts may be carried out.  This means that the offense relies heavily on the 
mental element of the terrorist financing offense.  A financer’s intention 
or knowledge alone can make the financier criminally liable and taint 
the funds or property collected, provided or possessed by the financer. 
But the question is what that intention or knowledge refers to.  In the 
absence of any connection between an act of financing and a subsequent 
criminal act, a financer must have “terrorist purposes” to be liable and 
subject to forfeiture sanctions.  In other words, the financer should intend 
or know that the funds, collected, provided or possessed by him or her, 
will be used for terrorist purposes.  However, both EU and ASEAN and 
their Member States did not define this term.  In the absence of an effort 
by the ASEAN and EU Member States to clarify what exactly consti-
tutes the mental element of the offence, I have examined three possible 
forms of mens rea (awareness of circumstances, general knowledge of a 
terrorist act, or knowledge of the identity of the recipient(s) of funds) 
determined by courts outside the EU and ASEAN jurisdictions.  My pur-
pose in examining these mental elements was to find out whether there is 
any interpretation of the mental element of the offence that can resolve 
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the ambiguity inherent in the definition of the offence.  As the analyses 
in this paper have shown, these mental elements are too vague and broad 
to be used as a mental element of the offense.  They have detrimental 
consequences in a way that would result in the imposition of liability on 
the innocent or well-intentioned accused (financers such as donors or 
humanitarian activists), and consequently result in the violation of rights 
to property by depriving the accused of his or her funds and property 
even when it is not proved to be used, or intended to be used, for com-
mission or preparation of any criminal activity.
With regard to the implementation of the UN Security Coun-
cil resolutions on freezing the assets of those listed as terrorists by the 
Sanction Committee, the ASEAN Member States seem to comply with 
the obligations imposed by the Security Council resolutions.  However, 
their compliance has resulted in the violation of the fundamental rights 
and due process protected by international human rights laws under the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.  The approach of the EU in adopt-
ing and implementing freezing measures in accordance with the Security 
Council resolutions has also resulted in the suspension of criminal law. 
Even the introduction of amendments to the EU policies, followed by 
EU court decisions, has not, for the reasons provided, alleviated the 
harsh and unjustified impact of these measures.
Regarding the analyses provided by this paper, it is fair to con-
clude that the EU’s and its Member States’ approach in adopting and 
implementing international counter-terrorist financing measures and in 
addressing the issues and ambiguities inherent in the ill-defined concept 
of terrorist financing is unpromising and in contradiction with the their 
policies and emphasis on the protection and promotion of human rights, 
rule of law, democratic values and good governance; so the EU seems to 
be a poor model for ASEAN to follow.

